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NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND SOME CAMPAIGN FINANCE
PROBLEMS
JOHN O. MCGINNIS*
ABSTRACT
This Article has both positive and normative objectives. As a
positive matter, it shows that the Roberts Courts campaign finance
regulation jurisprudence can be best explained as a systematic effort
to integrate that case law with the rest of the First Amendment,
making the neutral principles refined in other social contexts govern
this more politically salient one as well. It demonstrates that the
typical Roberts Court majority in campaign finance cases follows
precedent, doctrine, and traditional First Amendment theory, while
the dissents tend to carve out exceptions at each of these levels.
As a normative matter, it argues that following neutral principles
is particularly important in the application of the First Amendment
to campaign finance for three reasons. First, campaign finance
disputes bear directly on the political process that determines sub-
stantive results across the entire legislative policy space, making the
danger of political decision making particularly high. Second, the
First Amendment itself reflects a distrust of government officials,
and the more a constitutional provision reflects an economy of dis-
trust, the more it requires judicial constraint, which adherence to
neutral principles can provide. Third, given that politicians have
much to gain from skewing campaign finance regulations in their
favor and that judges are appointed by politicians, neutral principles
* George C. Dix Professor in Constitutional Law, Northwestern University. Thanks to
Nelson Lund, Jim Pfander, Mark Movsesian, Marty Redish, and participants in a Northwest-
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841
842 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:841
help avoid partisanship and the appearance of partisanship in judi-
cial decision making.
Finally, the Article confronts the most important arguments for
departing from standard First Amendment principles in campaign
finance and demonstrates that they have far-reaching implications,
in that they would allow the legislature to regulate the press or even
academics because of their disproportionate influence in politics. But
it also shows that, even taken on their own terms, the proposals for
judicial reform of First Amendment law in the campaign finance
area are deeply flawed. In particular, the idea that the Constitution
permits legislators to restrict the freedom of speech for fear it will
distort their decision making has no basis in the Constitution. The
Constitution provides no baseline for judging distortion, and indeed,
its structure permits legislators to take into account the information
generated by the First Amendments spontaneous order of freedom
rather than follow raw popular sentiment.
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INTRODUCTION
For the Roberts Court, campaign finance regulation raises the
most conceptually deep, most politically consequential, and most
persistently divisive constitutional questions. The questions are
deep because they highlight a fundamental conflict within liberal
democracy itself. Although some have seen liberal democracy as a
coherent and stable state to which history is inevitably trending,1
the concept contains within itself an inherent tension: the relative
priority between liberty, the voluntary and spontaneous ordering
generated by rights of individuals, democracy, and top-down order-
ing through collective decision making.
Giving priority to liberalism puts rights at the center of a regime.2
Under this view, the exercise of free speech rights generates a civic
order on which democracy rests, but which it must not control or
disturb. Giving priority to democracy, in contrast, puts the authority
of the people to govern themselves at the center, even at the expense
of individual rights.3
Debate at election time raises the conflict between speech rights
and democracy in its most acute form and along multiple dimen-
sions. First, democracy gives every citizen one vote with equal con-
sequences at the ballot box.4 The First Amendment gives citizens
equal rights against government restraints on their speech,5 but
equal rights naturally lead to unequal influence because of differ-
ences in endowment, position, and inclination. A few people are
articulate, but most are not. Some people are wealthy, others own
or work for the media or academia, and still others command atten-
tion through their own celebritybut most have none of these
advantages. Some people are so intensely interested in specific gov-
ernment projects or particular political ideals that they join together
1. Most famously in FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 47-50
(1992).
2. See Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L.REV. 43, 69 (1990).
3. See David Schultz, Democracy on Trial: Terrorism, Crime and National Security Policy
in a Post 9-11 World, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 195, 198, 246 (2008).
4. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415,
416, 476 (2003).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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to amplify their influence. But many, if not most, citizens are ration-
ally uninterested in the details of policy and politics and do not care
to speak out individually or in groups.6 Democracy gives everyone
an equal vote, but freedom inevitably leads to unequal voice.7
Second, elections in a democracy reflect a set of specific proce-
dures for selecting representatives and occur at a set place and time.
But the spontaneous order of civic discourse that the First Amend-
ment creates is not bounded in place or time. And that discourse
frames the campaign issues that determine which candidate is elec-
ted. In particular, the media importantly shapes the agenda for the
election long before the campaign period.8 But even before the media
helps set the agenda, it is influenced by political and social theo-
rists.9 Speech rights naturally embrace the continuity of political
and social discourse. In contrast, a focus on the mechanisms of dem-
ocratic choice suggests that the election season is a severable aspect
of civic life.
Finally, representative democracy empowers legislatures, which
can use that authority to pursue ideals, including the ideal struc-
tures for political campaigns. In contrast, the First Amendment is
premised in part on a distrust of legislators, however much they
claim to be motivated by political ideals. This premise underscores
that, at least when expression is concerned, government agents may
not be faithful servants of the publics interests, but rather of their
own.10 Thus, representative democracy and elections fundamentally
contrast with First Amendment speech rights in their nature, in
their temporal scope, and in the trust attributed to government
officials.
The Roberts Courts campaign finance regulation jurisprudence
is distinctive because it uses long-standing constitutional doctrine
6. See Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and the State Supreme Courts, 13
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 455, 476-77 (2010).
7. Rational ignorance stems from a brute fact of the world. A citizens input into the
democratic process, however well informed, is unlikely to be decisive given the large number
of voters for political offices of any significance. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of
Madisons Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1331
(1994). It is therefore rational to spend time learning about private enterprises or being enter-
tained rather than following politics.
8. See infra Part III.C.
9. See infra Part III.C.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 169, 292.
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shaped outside the electoral context to resolve these conflicts be-
tween free speech and representative democracy.11 First, precedent
shows that the First Amendment protects the exercise of free speech
rights even if these rights are routes to unequal influence and even
if individuals band together in partnerships or corporations to max-
imize that influence. Equalizing the exercise of rights has never
been a legitimate governmental purpose for regulating expression
because a right of free speech naturally leads to unequal influence.
Moreover, the Constitution does not provide any baseline for mea-
suring equality of influence. And trying to equalize the influence of
those with money naturally exacerbates the inequality of influence
along other dimensions such as celebrity and media access.
Second, both precedent and tradition demonstrate that a political
messages proximity to an election cannot be a justification for reg-
ulating it. As shown by the outcry over the governments claim in
Citizens United v. FEC that it could ban books about candidates
near an election, it would be intolerable to subject media to more
regulation at election time than at other times.12 The case law also
shows that individuals enjoy no less robust rights than those in the
professional media, indicating that the proximity of their messages
cannot be a basis of regulation either.13 More generally, given that
political discussion affecting political campaigns is not limited to the
election season, the timing of citizens messages about politics can-
not serve as a principled basis for regulation. In contrast, unlike
private citizens, government officials can use their office for corrupt
purposes. Thus, electoral contributions to candidates can be regu-
lated if the regulations meet other First Amendment standards.
Third, previous First Amendment cases provide stringent
standards for regulations focused on expression. These precedents
have repeatedly affirmed a distrust of regulation in this area and
have required the government to meet a number of doctrinal tests
to counter this skepticism.14 For instance, the government must
choose a narrowly tailored means of achieving even a legitimate,
11. See infra Part I.B.1.
12. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part I.B.7.
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content-neutral objective if its regulation targets expression.15 The
skepticism embodied in these traditional tests can hardly be sus-
pended for regulation connected to electoral messaging when the
positions of the legislative regulators are themselves at stake.
Respecting settled principles is essential in campaign finance reg-
ulation because there is no area in which political actors are more
interested in reordering a constitutional regime for their own
benefit. Political actors include the Justices themselves, who were
all appointed in a political process and have distinct political
affiliations. To depart from the Courts long-established First
Amendment principles in the context of electoral messaging and
contributionswithout a persuasive argument for reversal in the
original meaning of that Amendmentwould suggest that the
Supreme Court is trying to skew political campaigns for ideological,
and indeed partisan, reasons. To countenance laws, like many of the
campaign finance regulations invalidated by the Roberts Court, that
permit the media unlimited influence on elections, but that restrict
the influence of other citizens, is to give political preference to a
particular classa class that makes its living from social influence
and has an enduring ideological bias.
Part I of this Article demonstrates that the majority or plurality
of the Roberts Court grounds its campaign finance regulation opin-
ions in principles that are accepted elsewhere in free speech law: at
the levels of doctrinal conclusions, jurisprudential tests, and the
fundamental structure of First Amendment analysis. In contrast, all
but one of the dissents carve out exceptions for campaign finance
regulation from ordinary First Amendment analysis. And in that
case, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, the plurality and dissent
largely agreed on the standards to be applied as against a concur-
rence that the most senior dissenters in other cases wrote.16
Even citations in the cases in which the majority and dissent
disagreed on principles tell much the same story: the majority or
plurality opinions in these cases make approximately twice as many
citations to First Amendment cases outside the campaign finance
regulation area as do the dissents.17
15. See infra Part I.B.7.
16. See 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666, 1673, 1678 (2015).
17. To reach this conclusion, I compared the majority or plurality decision with the
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Thus, my objective in Part I is largely a positive one: to show that
the Roberts Courts campaign finance regulation jurisprudence can
be best explained as a systematic effort to integrate that jurispru-
dence with the rest of the First Amendment, making the principles
refined in other social spheres govern this one as well. Although law
professors have routinely attacked these decisions,18 including a
now-famous former law professor, President Barack Obama, at the
State of the Union,19 this Part offers a sustained explanation of how
they flow from existing law.20 The Part ends by suggesting that the
principal dissent, defined as the opinion joined by the largest number of dissenting Justices.
Thus, in each case there are two opinions that formed the basis of comparison. I set aside
Williams-Yulee, in which the plurality and the dissent agreed on the relevant standards as
against a concurrence. See id.
18. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, No Middle Ground?Reflections on the Citizens United
Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV. 649, 654-55 (2011) (criticizing Citizens United); Richard L. Hasen,
Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Courts Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1064-66 (2008) (criticizing FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life); Michael
J. Kasper, Magic Words and Millionaires: The Supreme Courts Assault on Campaign Fund-
ing, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 2, 24 (2008) (criticizing Davis v. FEC); Ellen D. Katz, Election
Laws Lochnerian Turn, 94 B.U. L. REV. 697, 697-98 (2014) (criticizing Arizona Free
Enterprise Clubs Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett); Burt Neuborne, Symposium: Welcome
to Oligarchs United, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 3, 2014, 11:17 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
04/symposium-welcome-to-oligarchs-united/ [https://perma.cc/N7NL-4DLU] (criticizing
McCutcheon v. FEC).
19. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address
(Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-
address [https://perma.cc/EM52-GJBC].
20. Some individual decisions have received defenses. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell,
Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J. 412, 417 (2013); Bradley
A. Smith, Separation of Campaign and State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2038, 2040 (2013)
(defending Davis v. FEC and Arizona Free Enterprise Clubs Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett).
Smiths defense, while interesting, is in a sense the opposite of that advocated here. He be-
lieves constitutional law needs a new doctrineseparation of campaign and statewhereas
this Article argues that campaign finance regulation jurisprudence has to be integrated with
the rest of existing free speech doctrine to guarantee its neutrality. See Smith, supra, at 2038,
2040. At least for regulation by states, as opposed to regulation by the federal government,
separation of campaign and state is no more a text-based principle than separation of church
and state. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 488-89 (2002)
(criticizing wall of separation as a metaphor for constitutional relation between church and
state). Certainly nothing in the federal Constitution prevents states from regulating cam-
paign-related activities unless they violate the First Amendment, and neutral principles of
First Amendment interpretation outside the campaign context are the best way to discover
these principles. It is true that there is a substantial argument as a matter of original
meaning that the federal government lacks any enumerated power over campaigns, see Robert
G. Natelson, The Original Scope of the Congressional Power to Regulate Elections, 13 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 1, 1, 5-6 (2010), but not a single Supreme Court Justice has accepted that claim
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integration is not yet complete, as the Roberts Court has not yet
united its treatment of campaign contributions with the rest of First
Amendment law: it has not yet fully explained the reason campaign
contributions are subject to First Amendment scrutiny. This Part
thus explores a rationale consistent with the rest of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence: regulating campaign contributions targets
speech because campaigns are inherently expressive in nature.
Part II describes why it is essential that general First Amend-
ment principles control the outcome of campaign finance regulation
cases. Our best guarantee that government officials, be they legis-
lators or judges, are not manipulating the First Amendment for
their own political and ideological benefit is that they apply its prin-
ciples in a neutral way. Campaign finance regulation can provide a
mask for creating a set of special rules for expression at election
time, when danger of manipulation by politicians and the judges
they appoint is the greatest. Moreover, the First Amendment is
premised in part on distrust of government officials.21 Thus, its
interpretive methodology should reflect the constraint on judicial
discretion that neutral principles can provide.22 This Part also
includes responses to conceptual objections to the possibility of
deploying neutral principles in this or any area of law.
Part III considers three kinds of challenges that commentators
have made against following general free speech principles in
campaign finance regulation. Though they employ different method-
ologies, all share the view that speech at election time differs from
expression at other times and can therefore be regulated as part of
an effort to perfect democracy.23
One attack on the Courts campaign finance regulation jurispru-
dence is that these principles get the First Amendment wrong as an
original matter. But these arguments are not well rooted in the
original meaning of the Constitution.24 For instance, Professor
Lawrence Lessig argues that republican principles at the time of the
for more than the century of campaign finance regulation. For a discussion of the principles
for overruling such deeply entrenched precedent, see JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B.
RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 175-96 (2013).
21. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III.A.
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Framing stressed that representatives must be dependent on the
people, and thus it should be constitutional to make sure that the
public opinion on which legislatures are dependent is free of distor-
tion from moneyed interests.25 But the Constitution does not provide
any metric to judge whether that opinion is distorted, nor any provi-
sion to suggest that legislators should follow the predominant
opinion of citizens on an issue.26 To the contrary, the Framers re-
jected direct democracy and the authority of the people to instruct
their representatives on how to vote.27 Another argument is that
other clauses of the Constitution, such as the Emoluments Clause,
reveal that the Framers were concerned about corruption.28 But
these clauses reflect concern about officials abuse of government
power, not about the rights of citizens.29 They thus reinforce the
message of distrust of those officials actions in regulating speech
even when government actors claim to be pursuing a political ideal,
including the ideal of making politics less corrupt.
The second kind of challenge stems from precedent, not about the
speech of citizens, but about the electoral mechanisms of govern-
ment.30 On the basis of this precedent, the argument runs, such
regulation should be upheld, because either the precedent shows
deference to electoral regulationas with gerrymandering doc-
trineor actually provides a mandate for such regulationas with
doctrine requiring one-person, one-vote.31 This Section contends that
these arguments mistake a core premise of the First Amendment
and its jurisprudence: free speech is a natural right of the individ-
ual, not a mechanism of government.32 Election precedent is thus
inapposite to campaign expression.33 First Amendment jurispru-
dence properly focuses on preventing government from interfering
with the civic order, whereas election law precedent focuses on
ensuring that the government fairly runs the elections for which it
25. See infra text accompanying notes 324-26.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 322-29.
27. See infra text accompanying note 329.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 336-40.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 342-46.
30. See infra Part III.B.
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. See infra Part III.B.
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is responsible.34 Moreover, given that political influence is not con-
fined to the electoral season, a focus on electoral mechanisms offers
no principled line for the regulation of political speech.35
Finally, various commentators have argued that some framework
other than traditional First Amendment principles should deter-
mine the result in campaign finance regulation cases.36 However,
these nonoriginalist and nonprecedential arguments lack the au-
thority to trump established principles of law.37 Indeed, the breadth
of these arguments underscores the violence that they do to settled
First Amendment principles, because they would justify regulation
of the media, particularly around election time.38
I. THE ROBERTS COURTS APPLICATION OF FREE SPEECH
PRINCIPLES TO CAMPAIGN FINANCE REGULATION
Campaign finance regulation cases are the most politically conse-
quential for the Roberts Court because campaign finance regulation
shapes the elections that affect all policy outcomes. Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. got far more press last term than the latest
campaign finance regulation decision, McCutcheon v. FEC,39 but
Hobby Lobby turns on an interpretation of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act,40 which Congress can amend in any respect it
chooses. It will be political campaigns that determine the success of
amendments. While NFIB v. Sebelius held that the federal govern-
34. See infra Part III.B.
35. See infra Part III.B.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 361-62.
37. See infra Part III.C.
38. See infra Part III.C.
39. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). In the first week after the Court decided Hobby Lobby, there
were 2915 mentions of that case in the press. Lexis Advance News Search for Hobby Lobby
from June 30, 2014 through July 7, 2014, LEXIS ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com (search
Hobby Lobby, narrow category to News, search within results for Hobby Lobby /3
Burwell or case, narrow timeline to June 30, 2014 to July 7, 2014). However, there were
only 1243 mentions of McCutcheon in the first week after the Court decided that case. Lexis
Advance News Search for McCutcheon from April 2, 2014 through April 9, 2014, LEXIS
ADVANCE, https://advance. lexis.com (search McCutcheon, narrow category to News, search
within results for McCutcheon /3 FEC or Federal Election Commission, or case, narrow
timeline to April 2, 2014 to April 9, 2014).
40. See 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014) (citing Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012)).
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ment can deploy the individual mandate to require insurance
purchases so long as it is understood as a tax,41 health care remains
a perennial issue that future Congresses will reshape. And cam-
paigns, affected in no small measure by the nature of campaign
finance regulations, will mold the composition of these Congresses.
This Part begins by briefly describing the Roberts Courts work
product in the campaign finance regulation area as well as briefly
summarizing Buckley v. Valeo, still the seminal case in this partic-
ular area of the First Amendment. It then shows that at every
leveldoctrinal, test, structural, and case citationsthe majority
or plurality opinions are closer to long-standing First Amendment
principles than are the dissents, particularly when cases outside the
context of campaign finance are considered.42
A. The Seven Roberts Court Campaign Finance Regulation
Decisions
There is no area of law in which the Roberts Court has been more
active or more divided than in campaign finance regulation. It has
decided six merits cases and one case per curiam for a total of seven
casesmore than one every two yearsand all were decided 5-4
except for one 6-3 decision. A brief description of their holdings
shows their breadth. All but one invalidated either state or federal
legislation, with the effect of deregulating electoral campaigns.
Randall v. Sorrell, the first campaign finance regulation decision
of the Roberts Court, and the only one decided 6-3 rather than 5-4,
was somewhat atypical, both because the issues did not seriously
41. See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012).
42. There is one exception to the point about citation counts. In Arizona Free Enterprise
Clubs Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, Justice Kagan attempted to show that Arizonas scheme
should be constitutional on account of First Amendment doctrine on government subsidies.
See 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2834 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting). Because this dissent attempts to base
its position in First Amendment law, it is a more persuasive legal analysis than the other
dissents in campaign finance regulation cases in the Roberts Court Era. Nevertheless, its
roots in First Amendment law are shallower than those of the majority and not sufficient to
support the doctrinal tree that Justice Kagan plants. See infra Part I.B.4. And as noted above,
supra note 17, I do not count Williams-Yulee in the citation list because a concurrence there
shows that some Justices who are pivotal to the outcome are in greater disagreement over
fundamental First Amendment principles with other members of the majority than is the
dissent. See infra Part I.B.5.
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test the boundaries of previous decisions and because the author of
the plurality opinion was Justice Breyer, who dissented in most
other campaign finance regulation cases decided by the Roberts
Court.43 In Randall, Vermont had limited the total amount of money
that a candidate could spend on his race and had sharply limited
contributions (to $400 for gubernatorial candidates, for instance)
far below the limitations for contributions in federal law.44 The
limitations even extended to a volunteers in-kind contributions,
such as the cost of driving to participate in campaigns.45
The case thus involved both of the core holdings of Buckley v.
Valeo, the 1976 case that remains the keystone in campaign finance
regulation.46 Buckley prohibited expenditure limits, including those
imposed on a candidates personal funds, because these limits
directly restricted political expression and the justification of equal-
izing speech was not a compelling one.47 On the other hand, Buckley
upheld reasonable contribution limits because the government had
an interest in avoiding corruption and the appearance of corruption,
to which substantial contributions could give rise.48 Contribution
limitations could be justified on anticorruption grounds so long as
the limitations were reasonable.49
The Buckley Court grounded its decision in the free speech case
law, but its explanation of why expenditures and contributions trig-
gered the First Amendment was not as clear as it could have been.
The distinction between conduct that raises no First Amendment
43. See 548 U.S. 230, 235 (2006).
44. Id. at 237-39.
45. Id. at 257, 260.
46. 424 U.S. 1 (1976); see Richard L. Hasen, The Nine Lives of Buckley v. Valeo, in FIRST
AMENDMENT STORIES 345, 345 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012).
47. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-54.
48. See id. at 28-29. The Court also held that an individuals interest in contributions was
weaker than his interest in making his own independent expenditures. See id. at 20-21.
49. The distinction between expenditures and contributions was widely criticized almost
as soon as Buckley was decided. See L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass Speech and the Newer First Amend-
ment, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 258-59 (critiquing the Courts distinction between proxy and
real speech). The better view is that the interest is the same, but that contributions can be
more easily related to that interest because they may be more likely to give rise to quid pro
quo corruption, which the government has a compelling interest to prevent. See infra text
accompanying notes 146-47, 153-54. The Court appears to be moving toward this view with
the stringent scrutiny it gave to contributions in McCutcheon. See infra text accompanying
notes 101, 157-62. This move, too, may represent a normalization of campaign finance regu-
lation principles with the rest of the First Amendment.
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questions and conduct that does turns on whether the harm from
the conduct that the regulation seeks to avoid is unrelated to the
communicative expression of the conduct.50 As Lillian BeVier has
written, the campaign finance regulations at issue in Buckley
sought to prevent harms that would only arise if giving and
spending money [had] communicative significance.51 For this rea-
son, limitations on expenditures and contributions properly trigger
scrutiny under the First Amendment.52 It is the effectiveness of
electoral messaging that creates the unequal playing field in an
election that regulation sought to prevent.53 It is a contributions
message of support that is related to singling out these contribu-
tions for regulation because of fear of political favoritism.54
The correctness of this conclusion is also readily apparent if we
test it by considering similar limitations outside the context of
campaign finance regulations. The First Amendment would obvi-
ously be triggered if the government wanted to restrict the amount
a newspaper could spend on its editorials or reporting. It would also
raise a First Amendment issue if the government wanted to limit
contributions to opinion magazines by citizens who supported their
viewpoints. It might be possible to justify these restrictions, but the
First Amendment would be clearly implicated, and thus, free speech
doctrine and tests would become relevant.
But even if Buckley was not as lucidly reasoned as it might have
been, it has remained the key case for campaign finance regula-
tion.55 Almost all subsequent campaign finance regulation reforms
work within its framework of analysis and with its distinction
between expenditures and contributions, although the reforms
sometimes attempt to find different structures for regulation and
new justifications not squarely presented in Buckley. All subsequent
Supreme Court decisions accept that campaign finance regulation
implicates the First Amendment.56
50. See United States v. OBrien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 381-82 (1968).
51. Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (1985).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 1058-60.
54. See id.
55. Hasen, supra note 46, at 345.
56. See id.
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Justice Breyers plurality opinion in Randall was a straightfor-
ward application of Buckley, invalidating Vermonts expenditure
limit as flatly inconsistent with Buckleys prohibition of expenditure
limits and holding that the contribution limits were unreasonably
low, particularly given the constraints on limits of volunteer ex-
penses.57 Justice Souter wrote the principal dissent.58 Justice Souter
would have remanded the case to the circuit court to determine
whether Vermonts interest in getting its officials to spend less time
on fundraising justified the expenditure limits and would have up-
held the contribution limits as reasonable.59
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., a more characteristic Roberts
Court campaign finance regulation case in its composition of the
majority and dissent, concerned the constitutionality of campaign
expenditures by corporations on political messaging.60 The Court
held that a corporation has the constitutional right to run advertise-
ments about political issues in the run-up to an election, even if the
advertisements implicit messages are unfavorable to a candidate.61
This decision appeared to cut back on a recent pre-Roberts Court
decision, McConnell v. FEC, which upheld the McCain-Feingold
Acts62 prohibition on corporations engaging in electioneering com-
munication[s],63 which the Act defined as broadcast advertisements
in the sixty days before a general election or thirty days before a
primary.64 Whereas McConnell had disposed of a facial challenge to
57. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236, 259-60 (2006). Justice Breyer was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. See id. at 230. Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia, concurred separately in the judgment, objecting to Buckleys previous
decision to subject contributions to a lower level of scrutiny, but joined the plurality in finding
both the Vermont expenditure and contribution limits unconstitutional. See id. at 235, 264-66.
58. See id. at 281 (Souter, J., dissenting). He was joined in full by Justice Ginsburg and
largely by Justice Stevens. See id. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent for himself, which sug-
gested that Buckleys restrictions on limiting expenditures should be overruled. See id. at 274
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 284-90 (Souter, J., dissenting).
60. See 551 U.S. 449, 455-56 (2007).
61. See id. at 449, 457.
62. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified
in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.). The Act is
also known as the McCain-Feingold Act, named after its sponsors in the Senate.
63. 540 U.S. 93, 244 (2003).
64. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (2012) (defining electioneering communication[s] as those dis-
seminated through broadcast media thirty days before a primary or sixty days before a
general election that refer[ ] to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office).
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the Act, Wisconsin Right to Life permitted a challenge to the appli-
cation of the Act to advertisements that focused on particular issues
and did not directly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate.65
Although Wisconsin Right to Life did not overrule McConnell, it
sharply limited the Acts constitutionally permissible scope to ex-
tend only to advertisements that were the functional equivalent of
express advocacy of the election or defeat of particular candidates.66
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the controlling opinion for himself and
Justice Alito.67 Justice Souter dissented, arguing that even on issue
advertising, Congress could legislate against the threat to demo-
cratic integrity stemming from the concentrations of money in
corporate and union treasuries.68
In Davis v. FEC, decided a year later, the question revolved
around another provision of the McCain-Feingold Act, the so-called
Millionaires Amendment.69 This decision concerned the interaction
of personal campaign expenditures and contribution limitations.70
In particular, this provision relaxed contribution limits for any
candidate whose opponent was spending substantial sums of his
own money.71 Justice Alito, writing for the same five-Justice major-
ity as in Wisconsin Right to Life, invalidated the provision on the
grounds that relaxing contribution limits for opponents burdened
the free speech rights of the candidate expending his own funds.72
The same four Justices dissented, arguing that the provision was
justified by the governments interest in showing that elections
could not be bought.73
Citizens United v. FEC, the best known of the Roberts Courts
campaign finance regulation cases, determined that Congress could
65. See Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 456.
66. Id. at 469-70.
67. See id. at 455. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas would have gone further and
overruled McConnells ban on independent corporate expenditures altogether, see id. at 483,
503-04 (Scalia, J., concurring), thereby presaging the decision in Citizens United, which Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would also join, see Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
316 (2010).
68. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 504 (Souter, J., dissenting). Breyer and the other
dissenters in Randall joined this dissent. See id.
69. See 554 U.S. 724, 729 (2008).
70. See id. at 728.
71. See id. at 729.
72. See id. at 728, 743-44.
73. See id. at 749, 756 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2016] CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROBLEMS 857
not impose expenditure limits on electoral messaging by corpora-
tions.74 In so doing, it overruled the recent contrary decision in
McConnell75 as well as the older contrary decision in Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce, the precedent that held that
corporate independent expenditures could be differentially regu-
lated because of their potential to distort the political process
through their concentrated power.76 Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority in Citizens United, held that the distortion rationale for
regulating corporations was incompatible with the First Amend-
ment because it restricted the speech of some to enhance that of
others.77 Justice Stevens dissented, emphasizing that the Framers
hostility toward corporations suggested that corporations did not
have the rights comparable to persons under the First Amend-
ment.78
Arizona Free Enterprise Clubs Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett,
decided a year later, was the first Roberts Court case to confront
questions related to the intersection of public financing of an elec-
tion with private expenditures and contributions.79 The same five-
member majority as in Citizens United invalidated an Arizona
public financing schemenot because public financing was illegal
per se, but because of the way it interacted with the right of a
candidate to spend his own money without limitation.80 Arizonas
74. See 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
75. Id. at 365-66 (overruling the part of McConnell that upheld the McCain-Feingold Acts
restrictions on corporate independent expenditures).
76. See 494 U.S. 652, 654-55, 658-60 (1990).
77. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319, 341. Justice Thomas joined the majority except that
he dissented from its decision to uphold disclosure requirements. Id. at 480 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Citizens United was also notable for reaffirming
that disclosure requirements are constitutional. See id. at 366-67 (majority opinion). Previous
campaign finance regulation cases, beginning with Buckley, had consistently upheld these
requirements on the grounds that the government interest in combating corruption was
advanced by disclosure. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 67-68 (1976). Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 191 (2010) was another Roberts Court case
that concerned disclosure. Although the case cited Buckley and other campaign finance
regulation cases, see id. at 196, it was not itself such a case because it concerned disclosure
of the signers of a petition to begin a referendum, rather than the contributors to a campaign
itself, id. at 190-91. The decision was 8-1, with only Justice Thomas dissenting. See id. at 228
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
78. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 425-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. See 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011).
80. See id.
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structure for election campaigns provided public funds to candidates
who agreed to abide by spending limits.81 But if they were opposed
by a candidate who did not agree to abide by the limits and spent
private funds on his or her own behalf, or had independent expendi-
tures made on his or her behalf beyond a certain limit, the publicly-
financed candidates received public funds in addition to their initial
allocation.82 Chief Justice Roberts held that the statute burdened
the First Amendment rights of candidates or their supporters who
spent their own funds to speak because the expenditures triggered
a government decision to release additional funds to the opponents
of the candidate.83 Justice Kagan dissented on the grounds that the
government could constitutionally decide to subsidize speech as it
chose.84
In McCutcheon, the Court turned its attention to contribution
limitsnot limits on personal contributions to individual candi-
dates, but limits on total personal contributions in federal elec-
tions.85 The McCain-Feingold Act had imposed ceilings on total
individual contributions of $48,600 for all candidates running for
federal office and of $74,600 on contributions to political commit-
tees, such as those run by political parties.86 Writing for a plurality
of the usual group of Justices who comprise the majority in Roberts
Court campaign finance decisions, with the exception of Justice
Thomas, Chief Justice Roberts invalidated the ceilings.87 He argued
that because all the contributions that petitioner Shaun
McCutcheon made complied with the direct contribution limits
pertaining to individual candidates or partieslimits that were
designed to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption
simply multiplying the number of noncorrupting contributions could
not itself be corrupt or apparently corrupt.88 Justice Breyer demurred,
81. See id. at 2813-14.
82. See id. at 2813-16.
83. See id. at 2813.
84. See id. at 2830, 2833-34 (Kagan, J., dissenting). The dissenters were the same as in
Citizens United, but with the substitution of Justice Kagan for the retired Justice Stevens.
85. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
86. Id. The limits were first imposed in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, and
then raised in amount but continued in effect in McCain-Feingold. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1442, 1452. Justice Thomas concurred in large part and in the judgment,
while contending that individual contribution limits should be invalidated as well. Id. at 1464-
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arguing that the majoritys definition of corruption was too narrow
and that the aggregate limits helped prevent evasion of individual
limits.89
Williams-Yulee, decided last year, was in some respects an outlier
among the campaign finance cases in its division between the
members of the majority and dissent, the former being composed of
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan, and the latter being composed of Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.90 Moreover, the majority itself was
fractured on the fundamental issue of what standard to apply to the
bar regulation at issue. Only Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan held the standard to be a compelling state
interest.91 Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, stated that
the Court should not apply such an exacting standard.92 It was the
dissenters who agreed with Chief Justice Roberts that the correct
standard to apply was that of a compelling interest.93 Chief Justice
Roberts and the dissent, however, disagreed on whether the stan-
dard had been met, with the Chief Justice concluding that the
regulation was sufficiently narrowly tailored and not too overinclu-
sive or underinclusive to achieve the goal of protecting the integrity
of the judiciary.94
The above summary suffices to suggest that campaign finance
regulation has been persistently contested on the Roberts Court,
and no issue has generated such unyielding divisions. A fault line
generally divides the principles of one set of the JusticesChief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alitofrom those generally in dissentJustices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan (and Souter and Stevens when they were on
the Court). The former group believes that campaign finance regula-
tions should be analyzed under general free speech principles.95 The
65 (Thomas, J., concurring).
89. See id. at 1465-66, 1468, 1471-72 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was joined
by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. See id. at 1465.
90. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1661 (2015).
91. See id. at 1666.
92. See id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
93. See id. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. See id. at 1666-72.
95. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339-40 (2010).
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latter generally seeks to decide campaign finance regulation issues
by considerations unique to campaign finance regulation.96
This doctrinal disagreement plays out at a variety of levels. The
Citizens United majority protected corporations in the context of
campaign finance regulation as the Supreme Court has in other
areas of the First Amendment.97 The dissenters would not have.98
That majority rejected as compelling interests those that were
rejected elsewhere in the First Amendment, like concerns over dis-
tortion or equality.99 The dissenters would have accepted such inter-
ests as justifications.100 The Justices also disagreed on the doctrinal
tests to be applied to assess the bona fides of campaign finance
regulation. The Citizens United and McCutcheon majorities applied
traditionally stringent tests for justifying intrusion on First
Amendment interests.101 The dissenters would have given deference
to the legislature.102 Finally, the majority and the dissenters persis-
tently disagreed on the structure of the First Amendment. As in
cases outside the campaign finance context, the Citizens United and
McCutcheon majorities treated the right as that of the private
individual and private organization, with government interests only
measured to determine whether they were strong enough to over-
come those rights.103 The dissenters would have made a conception
96. See, e.g., id. at 394-95 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
97. Id. at 342 (majority opinion) (The Court has recognized that First Amendment protec-
tion extends to corporations.... This protection has been extended by explicit holdings to the
context of political speech.) (internal citations omitted).
98. See id. at 425 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (critiquing the
majority for failing to make First Amendment distinctions for corporations in the case of
campaign finance regulation).
99. See id. at 349-57 (majority opinion).
100. See id. at 465-77 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1464 (2014); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
324-26.
102. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1480 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (concluding that campaign
finance regulations relating to corporate speech are better suited for Congress than the
Court); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 461-62 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (concluding that Congress is better equipped to handle campaign finance regulations
relating to corporate speech because of its wisdom and experience in these matters).
103. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448 (The First Amendment is designed and intended
to remove government restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us. (quoting Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971))); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341 (We find no basis for the
proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions
on certain disfavored speakers.).
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of democratic self-governance count in defining the right itself, thus
changing the nature of free speech when it was electoral expres-
sion.104 Together, these pervasive and consistent differences in the
analysis between the Justices in the majority and the Justices in the
dissent make an overwhelming case that the core disagreement
goes to whether First Amendment principles settled in other areas
of the law apply to campaign finance regulation.
B. Free Speech Principles
1. Doctrinal Conclusions
The most obvious example of a doctrine applied elsewhere in the
First Amendment that the Roberts Court insists be applied in
campaign finance regulation is that of corporate personhood. The
Court correctly noted that its First Amendment case law has con-
sistently provided protections to corporations in contexts other than
campaign finance regulation.105 Many famous First Amendment
decisions have protected the rights of for-profit corporations. Land-
mark cases such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which strength-
ened protections against libel suits by public officials, involved the
First Amendment rights of corporations.106 And the Courts protec-
tion of corporations has not been limited to media corporations or to
political speech. Commercial speech cases, which extended free
speech rights to advertising and other commercial matters, largely
stemmed from lawsuits by corporations.107 Thus, given that the
104. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1466-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the
integrity of our public governmental institutions and the risk of corruption are satisfactory
reasons to regulate corporate speech as it relates to elections); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
451-52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that the Framers
would have rejected the idea of corporate speech in the electoral context because of the threat
it posed to republican self-government).
105. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342-43.
106. See 376 U.S. 254, 283-92 (1964); see also Garrett Epps, Dont Blame Corporate
Personhood, AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 16, 2012), http://prospect.org/article/dont-blame-corporate-
personhood [https://perma.cc/UC6S-M53Y] (The idea that corporations have some of the free-
speech rights that people have is essential to important Court decisions like New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan.).
107. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (holding that a
complete ban on advertising alcohol was unconstitutional under the First Amendment); Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Commn of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986) (holding that requiring
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Courts case law under the First Amendment has provided protec-
tions to corporations in all contexts other than campaign finance
regulation, it would be anomalous to deprive them of protections in
this context without the kind of compelling interest that is accepted
as a justification for abridging speech rights in other areas of First
Amendment law.
Justice Stevenss reaction in the dissent to this normalization was
to extend the area of dispute. He was not content to suggest that the
distortion rationale for campaign finance regulation had a particu-
lar resonance with the corporate form.108 He raised more general
questions about the extension of the First Amendment to corpora-
tions themselves, arguing that materials at the Founding suggested
that the Framers ... took it as a given that corporations could be
comprehensively regulated in the service of the public welfare.109
There are problems with Justice Stevenss argumentfirst as an
argument sufficient to overcome the long-established precedent that
the First Amendment protects corporations, and second as an orig-
inalist argument on its own terms. As to precedent, most original-
ists, and certainly Justice Stevens, accept that some doctrine is so
well established that it should not be overturned.110 Accepting that
electric company to carry messages that rebutted its own political message violated the First
Amendment); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
571-72 (1980) (holding that regulation that completely banned electric utility from advertising
violated the First Amendment); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Commn of N.Y., 447
U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (holding that prohibiting inserts that an electric company sent to its
consumers on controversial regulatory issues violated the First Amendment).
108. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 425 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This argument focuses
on the distortion that the aggregate wealth of corporations is thought to create in the demo-
cratic process. The argument is addressed at notes 324-29 infra and accompanying text.
109. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Justice Stevens, for instance, has signed on to a statement of precedent that would
follow a presumption in favor of precedent. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (suggesting that precedent should be followed unless it is, among other
things, unworkable, based on facts that had changed, and/or engendered no reliance). Like
most Supreme Court opinions, the majority in Citizens United did not purport to reconsider
the corporate electoral messaging in light of the original meaning, but built its arguments on
First Amendment precedent about corporate speech and other matters.
Leo Strine and Nicholas Walter end an article critiquing originalist support for corporate
speech by saying that the decision in Citizens United is more original than originalist. Leo
E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Originalist or Original: The Difficulties of Reconciling
Citizens United with Corporate Law History 90 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 812, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 2564708
[https://perma.cc/5KQ5-4WP7]. That comment is an amusing play on words, but it would be
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corporations can be comprehensively regulated by the government
would lead to overturning caseslike Sullivan, now at the core of
the First Amendmentas well as almost the entire corpus of
commercial speech law.111 Even originalists who impose quite a high
standard for following precedent rather than the original meaning
would hesitate to do so, particularly when the originalist arguments
are as weak as those here.112
Second, as to originalism, there are powerful reasons in the text
and structure of the First Amendment not to distinguish as a matter
of coverage between speech by associations, including corporations,
and individuals.113 The First Amendment is unambiguously phrased
as a prohibition on Congress and makes no distinctions among as-
sociations, corporations, and individuals.114 Thus, the original public
meaning does not discriminate between individuals and organ-
izations of any kind.115
really novel if the Supreme Court started reconsidering all elements of First Amendment
doctrine, however well established, by reference to original meaning.
111. For a discussion of this long line of precedent, see infra notes 129-33 and accompany-
ing text. It is true that Citizens United itself overruled two cases, see infra note 297 and
accompanying text, but these precedents are not nearly as well established as the general
corporate right to speech. Justice Stevenss originalist arguments are an attack on that
doctrine and are in no way limited to the electoral messaging by a corporation at issue in
Citizens United.
112. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 20, at 175-85 (suggesting that precedents
should be retained when it would be very costly to overrule them or when they reflect strong
societal consensus).
113. Perhaps the government has a stronger interest in regulating corporations. For a
discussion of such a distortion rationale, see infra notes 324-27 and accompanying text. But
the nature of permissible regulation is a different matter from whether corporations enjoy
First Amendment rights.
114. Leo Strine and Nicholas Walter argue that the text of the First Amendment is ambig-
uous with regard to speech by associations organized in corporate form. See Strine & Walter,
supra note 110, at 16-17. First, they note that the First Amendment is not thought to protect
the speech of trees and polar bears, and this fact shows that there is potential ambiguity in
its coverage. Id. at 17 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 391-92 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
With respect, animals and plants do not offer messages, whereas here in our actual world,
associations, including corporations, offer messages all the time and did so at the time of the
Framing. Their hypothetical is literally a fairy tale. Second, they note that Justice Scalia, as
well as other Justices, agree that some kinds of speech, such as fighting words, are not
protected. Id. at 18. But this argument goes to the nature of expression, not to the question
of whether it applies to people acting in concert by using the corporate form.
115. For a discussion of the rise of original public meaning originalism, see Lawrence B.
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 926-34 (2009).
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To be sure, if the language were ambiguous, some originalists
think the expected applications of a constitutional provision could
be relevant to discerning its public meaning.116 But Justice Stevens
provides only statements of generalized distrust of corporations in
support of his position. He does not offer any evidence that the en-
actors of the First Amendment thought Congress had the authority
to regulate the speech of corporations. And at the time the First
Amendment was enacted, it applied only to Congress.117 It would
thus be weak evidence of expected applications of the First Amend-
ment even if state legislatures prohibited speech by corporations.118
Moreover, even if there had been scattered expectations by some
people at the time of the Framing, the logic of the First Amendment
cuts against them because it undermines a distinction between in-
dividuals acting alone and through the organizations they form,
including corporations. A corporation is a nexus of contracts, like a
partnership, by which individuals make their actions more effective
than they would be if they pursued them individually.119 If under
the First Amendment an individual has the right to speak, why do
partnerships or other associations of individuals not also enjoy that
right? And if a partnership or association has that right, why does
it lose it upon taking the corporate form? Given that the First
Amendment also contains a right of assembly,120 joint action to
116. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 379-80 (2007) (requiring strong reasons for
believing the [original] applications were mistaken, rather than being merely applications
modern interpreters happen to reject).
117. See Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833) (stating that the Bill of Rights
contain[s] no expression indicating an intention to apply [the amendments] to the state gov-
ernments and that, as written, the amendments are to be applied only to Congress).
118. By the incorporation doctrinewhich Stevens did not challengethis prohibition,
along with many other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was extended to state legislatures. See
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating free speech provisions of the First
Amendment against the states). There may well be good originalist arguments against the
incorporation of the First Amendment, but the Court has accepted the principle for decades.
And, in any event, Citizens United, like most of the Roberts Court campaign finance cases,
concerns regulation by the federal government.
119. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11
(1976).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. I (Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
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speak mediated through contract fits comfortably within the same
protections enjoyed by individual action.
Finally, the First Amendments purpose is well served by permit-
ting citizens to use mechanisms such as corporations for concerted
action that give them more effective speech rights. Individuals are
often relatively powerless to make their message heard when acting
alone and thus are without much recourse for contesting the actions
of government officials.121 Together, in associationswhether part-
nerships, nonprofits, or for-profit corporationsthey have a bigger
megaphone and a larger capacity to persuade others about the
merits and demerits of government action.122
Citizens United has facilitated citizens joining together for polit-
ical speech by contributing not only to nonprofit corporations, but to
so-called Super PACs. A Super PAC is a political committee
registered with the FEC.123 It remains subject to the federal organ-
izational, registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements that
apply to other political committees.124 A Super PAC may then make
independent expenditures on behalf of, or against, candidates.125
Before Citizens United, there was a substantial question about
whether contribution limits could be applied to Super PACs.126 But,
citing Citizens United, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that limits on contributions to vehicles for
independent expenditures were unconstitutional.127 Super PACs
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.) (emphasis added).
121. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (An individuals freedom to
speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be
vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in
group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed.).
122. See John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocquevilles America: The Rehnquist Courts Juris-
prudence of Social Discovery, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 485, 528 (2002) (noting that associations of
speakers amplify their power).
123. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (2006 & Supp. IV 2007).
124. Id.
125. See Jan Witold Baran & Caleb P. Burns, Political Contributions and Expenditures by
Corporations, in COURSE HANDBOOK FOR CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 2015: COMPLYING
WITH CAMPAIGN FINANCE, LOBBYING AND ETHICS LAWS 97 (2015); Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
Super PACs,OPENSECRETS,http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php [https://perma.cc/
9WZU-7XRJ] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016) (detailing FEC treatment of Super PACs).
126. For a full discussion, see Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1656-
57 (2012).
127. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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enable individuals to band together for candidates and causes, thus
preventing independent expenditures from becoming the preserve
of extremely wealthy individuals who could fund expenditures on
their own, regardless of whether a corporation or Super PAC was
available to them. Thus, far from being simply a source of inequal-
ity, Citizens United increased the opportunities for expression for a
wider group of citizens.128 This effect underscores the spontaneous
order aspects of free speech: individuals combine freely to do that
which they could not do effectively alone.
Second, the Court also renormalized First Amendment law in re-
fusing to make any distinctions between the media and the rest of
the public. The Supreme Court had long refused to give special First
Amendment protections to the press that it did not extend to other
entities. It has refused to uniquely enable reporters to protect the
identities of their sources,129 or to be exempt from labor,130 anti-
trust,131 or other laws,132 even if an argument could be made that
such exemptions would enhance their information-providing func-
tions.133
The traditional parity between the media and nonmedia voices in
campaigns is an important theme of the majoritys campaign finance
regulation decisions. For instance, the Roberts Court majority
128. For a discussion of the egalitarian effect of Citizens United, see generally Abby K.
Wood & Douglas M. Spencer, In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency on
State Political Campaigns (Univ. of S. Cal. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
15-29, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1901551 [https://perma.cc/
56JW-KWNN].
129. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697-98 (1972) (refusing to permit the First
Amendment creation of a shield to allow reporters to avoid disclosing the identities of their
sources when subpoenaed).
130. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 129 (1937) (permitting reporters to bar-
gain collectively).
131. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1945) (prohibiting newspa-
pers from entering in consortium that the Court believed represented a restraint of trade
under the Sherman Act).
132. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991) ([G]enerally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press
has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.... [E]nforcement of such
general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to
enforcement against other persons or organizations.).
133. For a full discussion of these cases, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an
Industry, or for the Press as a Technology?From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459,
506-21 (2012). McConnell also relies on this parity in his Press Clause analysis. See
McConnell, supra note 20, at 433-34.
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observed that banning a message from the media similar to that
offered by Citizens United at the time of the election would be un-
thinkable.134 Indeed, the governments admission at the first oral
argument in Citizens United that principles it supported would
allow the banning of campaign books and pamphlets distributed by
corporations around election time135 was widely seen as devastating
to the governments chances of prevailing. Thus, given that such in-
terference was impermissible, neutral principles required nondis-
crimination, and nonmedia corporations should also be protected.
In McCutcheon, the Court extended the comparison from the con-
text of independent expenditures to the context of contributions. In
noting that McCutcheon would not have substantial alternative
avenues to express his support for a candidate if aggregate limits
prevented him from making a contribution, the majority contrasted
his position with a Hollywood entertainer who could easily attract
a crowd for fundraisers to express his or her support for many candi-
dates.136 A celebrity can contribute his reputation to a campaigna
reputation that itself is a media product.
The Roberts Court followed traditional First Amendment analysis
in refusing to treat those broadly understood to be in the media and
those outside the media unequally when it came to spending money
to support speech at election time. First, there does not seem to be
any justification for making a distinction between those who own a
press or media outlet and those who want to rent one.137 The First
Amendment, by its text, does not distinguish between these dif-
ferent kinds of property rights, and there is nothing adduced in the
purpose or history of the Amendment that would justify differential
constitutional treatment. It is certainly not a distinction that easily
maps on to any equality claims. There are many fewer people who
134. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352-53 (2010).
135. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-29, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
(No. 08-205); see also Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts
Orchestrated the Citizens United Decision, NEW YORKER, May 21, 2012, at 36 (suggesting that
this concession changed the course of the case even though Solicitor General Elena Kagan
changed the governments position at the second oral argument in the case and said the
government could not ban books produced by corporations, even if it could ban corporate
advertisements).
136. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1449 (2014).
137. See McConnell, supra note 20, at 419 (arguing that the Press Clause protects the
activity of publishing rather than the institution).
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own media outlets or who, by dint of their celebrity, are in a sense
their own outlets than those who have sufficient resources to make
media buys or contribute to a lot of candidates.
Second, applying neutral principles is particularly important if
the speakers who own or have preferred access to media outlets
have distinctive political views. And that is the case in the United
States: reporters lean Democrat to Republican by about four to
one.138 The mix is even more unbalanced if one looks to those in en-
tertainment139 or education140 who also can speak constantly about
politics and political ideas. These groups have particularly powerful
platforms because their vocations make it easy for them to directly
propagate ideas even outside the electoral season. They therefore do
not have to seek the attention of the public by buying campaign
advertisements at election time. In contrast, the wealthy have a
partisan mix that looks a lot more like the rest of society.141 As a
138. LARS WILLNAT & DAVID H. WEAVER, THE AMERICAN JOURNALIST IN THE DIGITAL
AGE: KEY FINDINGS 11 (2014), http://news.indiana.edu/releases/iu/2014/05/2013-american-
journalist-key-findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA9U-9BFE] (revealing 2013 survey data in
which 7.1 percent of journalists identified as Republican whereas 28.1 pecent identified as
Democrat). For other evidence that journalists are generally left-leaning, see The American
Journalist, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 6, 2006), http://www.journalism.org/node/2304 [https://
perma.cc/M4X7-CTRH] (discussing data from a recent book titled The American Journalist
in the 21st Century: U.S. News People at the Dawn of a New Millennium in which the authors
conclude that, although journalists have moved slightly to the right since the 1990s, they are
still considerably more liberal than the general public).
139. It is almost universally accepted that Hollywood is predominately left-leaning. For an
example of one of the many sources asserting that Hollywood is overwhelmingly liberal, see
BEN SHAPIRO, PRIMETIME PROPAGANDA: THE TRUE HOLLYWOOD STORY OF HOW THE LEFT TOOK
OVER YOUR TV 2-3 (2011). Even the jokes on late-night TV make Republican candidates the
target at election time by a two-to-one ratio. See S. ROBERT LICHTER ET AL., POLITICS IS A
JOKE!: HOW TV COMEDIANS ARE REMAKING POLITICAL LIFE 70 (2015).
140. Strikingly, Ivy League professors, who have some of the most prestigious platforms
in higher education, gave 96 percent of their campaign contributions to Barack Obama as
opposed to Mitt Romney. Oliver Darcy, 96% of Political Donations from Ivy League Faculty
& Staff Went for Obama, CAMPUS REFORM (Nov. 27, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://www.campus
reform.org/?ID=4511 [https://perma.cc/S9L7-J7ZC]. In elite law schools, the ratio of Demo-
cratic to Republican contributors is about five to one. John O. McGinnis et al., The Patterns
and Implications of Political Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J. 1167,
1170 (2005). The evidence demonstrating that academics have traditionally affiliated them-
selves with the Democratic Party is long standing. Two surveys of political scientists in 1959
and 1970 revealed that 75 percent of respondents were Democrats, far greater than the
general population. Henry A. Turner & Carl C. Hetrick, Political Activities and Party
Affiliations of American Political Scientists, 25 W. POL. Q. 361, 362 (1972).
141. For instance, in 2008, those with incomes of $250,000 and above favored President
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result, it is especially problematic for the Court to permit the
suppression of speech of nonmedia speakers, entrenching by law the
gatekeeper role in public discourse.
Just as the Court looked to the First Amendment principles
outside of campaign finance regulation to determine what entities
should be protected in the context of campaign finance regulation,
so too it applied settled First Amendment doctrine to determine
what kind of interests would be strong enough to support restric-
tions on speech.142 To be sure, some of these had been previously
articulated in the context of campaign finance regulation cases, but
the Court reasserted and refined them by considering more general
First Amendment principles.
For instance, the Citizens United Court rejected the arguments
that Austin had accepted as sufficiently compelling interests to
restrict corporate speech.143 Foremost among those government
interests was the antidistortion rationalenamely, that corpora-
tions, with their ability to amass funds, will distort debate on an is-
sue or candidate.144 The Court held that the antidistortion rationale
was in essence another name for requiring less speech from some to
equalize the opportunities for others.145 It was thus inconsistent
with Buckleys rejection of the proposition that equalizing the play-
ing field through campaign finance regulation restrictions was a
compelling interest.146 The conclusion is self-evident in areas outside
this regulatory field. It would obviously be impermissible to force
media celebrities to speak less on a subject because the greater
attention they command would skew public discourse.
Obama by a small margin. R.M. Schneiderman, How Did Rich People Vote, and Why?, N.Y.
TIMES: ECONOMIX (Nov. 11, 2008, 5:27 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/11/
how-did-rich-people-vote-and-why/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/FBA8-MGMJ]; see also Election
Center2008,CNN,http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=USP00p1 [https://
perma.cc/985L-PG46] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016). Even among the larger spenders there is a
lot of ideological diversity, with the Koch Brothers and Sheldon Adelson on the right, and Tom
Steyer and George Soros on the left. See Steve Friess & Michael Keller, Follow the Money: Big
Donors Leave Big Mark on 2014 Elections, AL JAZEERA AM. (Nov. 1, 2014, 12:44 PM), http://
america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/11/big-election-donors2014.html [https://perma.cc/
4X93-5GZ7].
142. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 392-93 (2010).
143. See id. at 351-52.
144. See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
145. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350-51.
146. See id.
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The Roberts Court majority also made clear that corruption and
the appearance of corruptionthe one interest that had been
deemed a compelling justification for campaign finance regula-
tionhad to be interpreted narrowly enough to fit within First
Amendment norms. The Citizens United Court held that an
independent expenditure was not corrupt, nor did it generate an
appearance of corruption, even if those who made such expenditures
had more influence or gained more access.147 As the Court stated,
Democracy is premised on responsiveness,148 and [t]he appear-
ance of influence or access ... will not cause the electorate to lose
faith in our democracy.149 Moreover, the Court noted that [r]eli-
ance on a generic favoritism or influence theory ... is at odds with
standard First Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and
susceptible to no limiting principle. 150
Thus, a theme of the Roberts Court jurisprudence is that even the
content of interests that traditionally have been held to justify
campaign finance regulation must be cabined to make sure that
they are not enlarged in matters that would be impermissible in
other First Amendment contexts. The Court is making sure that the
interests accepted as compelling in the campaign finance regulation
context do not drift to mean something functionally different than
they do in other First Amendment contexts. It is always a danger
that, as case law in one area becomes isolated from its roots in more
general doctrine, its fidelity to the doctrine will become ever more
attenuated, as with the distortions in a game of telephone.
In particular, the Citizens United Court saw that expanding the
corruption rationale beyond the attempt to prohibit quid pro quo
corruption could not be squared with the rest of First Amendment
law. Speech in any context provides a route to influence or access.
Reporters have access because they write about politicians. Pundits
have influence because they pontificate and move voters. Celebrities
have access because they add luster to officials. But it is obvious
that the First Amendment would not allow Congress to limit report-
ing, punditry, or the effusions of celebrity. As a result, corruption
147. Id. at 359-60.
148. Id. at 359 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003)).
149. Id. at 360.
150. Id. at 359 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 296).
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had to be defined narrowly as an exchange of support for a vote or
other political favor. In contrast to prohibiting influence and access,
preventing bribery would be compelling in any First Amendment
context, let alone that of campaigns.151
The narrowing of the scope of this interest was in turn important
in the Courts decision to invalidate aggregate contribution limits in
McCutcheon. The Court majority reasoned that contributing to
many candidates might give McCutcheon more influence and more
access, but more contributions did not raise the risk of quid pro quo
corruption because that risk came from individual quid pro quo
arrangements and did not increase with more contributions.152 The
Court sharply distinguished the gratitude that leaders of a party
would feel toward a donor that gave widely distributed support from
quid pro quo corruption: To recast such shared interest, standing
alone, as an opportunity for quid pro quo corruption would dramati-
cally expand government regulation of the political process.153 In
support, the Court cited cases for the proposition that political par-
ties enjoy substantial First Amendment protections.154
Here the Court again followed the logic of the First Amendment
by refusing to regulate access and gratitude differently. Gratitude
and the grant of access for party organizers who help elect federal
candidates is the coin of the realm in politics. There is no constitu-
tional justification to single out for less protection private donors
who have less influence than these political actors.
2. Constitutional Tests
The Roberts Court majority and plurality opinions have not only
renormalized campaign finance regulation law by aligning their
doctrinal conclusions with the rest of First Amendment law, but
151. For instance, in a context distinct from campaign finance regulation, the Court has
interpreted the Sherman Act to permit petitioning the government, even if that petitioning
seeks anticompetitive action by government. But that immunity does not extend to attempts
to influence the government through bribery. See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head,
Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 504 (1988); Cal. Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513
(1972).
152. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1452 (2014).
153. Id. at 1461.
154. See id. (citing Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572-73 (2000); Tashjian
v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214-16 (1986)).
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they have also deployed the standard of review and tests that this
body of law has elsewhere employed. Thus, the Roberts Court has
refused to defer to the legislatures factual claims, instead requiring
legislation to burden rights no more than is necessary to meet its
objectives, and making sure that the legislation is not over- or un-
derinclusive. This kind of analysis not only comports with other
First Amendment cases,155 but is generally consistent with cases
protecting other fundamental rights.156
In First Amendment cases, the government bears the burden of
showing that it has a compelling factual predicate for its interests.157
The Roberts Court majority has insisted that the government bear
the burden of proving the need for its campaign finance regula-
tions.158 For instance, this burden made a difference to the result in
McCutcheon. The governments principal argument there was that
the aggregate limits helped prevent circumvention of the individual
limits.159 It offered various possible scenarios that showed how such
circumvention might occur.160 The main concern was that a con-
tributor could evade the limits on contributions to a particular
candidate by giving to other political action committees (PACs) or
party committees that were likely to give more money to the candi-
date of his choice.161 But the government did not provide evidence of
the likelihood of its scenarios. Moreover, given that the contributor
would suffer substantial dilution of his contributionbecause the
PACs must give to others besides his favored candidatethis sce-
nario and others were sufficiently implausible that the Government
155. See, e.g., Brown v. Entmt Merchs. Assn, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741-42 (2011) (noting that
when legislative objectives affect First Amendment rights they must be pursued by means
that are neither seriously underinclusive nor seriously overinclusive).
156. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnor-
malities, 75 IND. L.J. 77, 108-09 (2000) (discussing the underinclusiveness inquiry in the
context of fundamental rights and free exercise cases).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entmt Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 (2000)
(discussing the requirement that the government bear the burden of showing both that the
legislature has presented evidence of an actual problem that is in need of solution and that
the law is aimed at solving that problem); see also Note, Deference to Legislative Fact
Determinations in First Amendment Cases After Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REV.
2312, 2317 (1998) (outlining the governments burden in First Amendment cases).
158. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1453-55.
161. See id. at 1453.
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ha[d] not carried its burden of demonstrating that the aggregate
limits further[ed] its anticircumvention interest.162
In direct contradiction, Justice Breyers McCutcheon dissent sug-
gested that Congresss judgment about the need for these rules to
prevent circumvention was entitled to deference: These kinds of
questions, while not easily answered, are questions that Congress
is far better suited to resolve than are judges.163 Similarly, in Citi-
zens United, Justice Stevens stated that campaign legislation was
entitled to presumptive deference.164 Thus, the majority and
dissenting Justices fundamentally clash on the standard of review
in campaign finance regulation cases.
Here, too, the majority is better rooted in First Amendment law.
Outside of national security questions, in which the Court may have
trouble evaluating justifications,165 the Court does not generally
defer to legislative judgments about the need to curtail First
Amendment freedoms. This decision not to defer is generally consis-
tent with the standard of review in other constitutional rights
contexts.166 But it has particular bite in the First Amendment con-
text because the right of electoral expression is one that legislators
may particularly want to suppress, given that it threatens their
power and, indeed, their continuance in office.
Breyers contrary argument is akin to an administrative expertise
claim.167 His contention is that members of Congress run for elec-
tions and thus are uniquely knowledgeable in determining the rules
for regulating these campaigns.168 But this assertion focuses only on
knowledge and ignores the interest of members of Congress. Incum-
bent members of Congress have a substantial interest in regulating
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1480 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 461 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
165. See Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, Note, Title X, The Abortion Debate, and The First Amend-
ment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1737, 1753 n.103 (1990) (noting that in national security cases the
judiciary defers to the governments factual claims).
166. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 962-64
(2002) (discussing searching scrutiny applied in equal protection cases).
167. See William D. Araiza, Deference to Congressional Fact-Finding in Rights-Enforcing
and Rights-Limiting Legislation, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878, 887 (2013) (noting the analogy
between an expertise argument for deference to Congress and deference to administrative
agency).
168. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1480 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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campaigns to protect their incumbency. And given that the First
Amendment singles out this right for protection from Congress, at
least in part because of distrust of legislators benevolence in this
area,169 it is interest rather than knowledge that should guide the
standard of review.170 Deferring to legislative expertise on cam-
paigns turns the First Amendments charter of freedom into a
delegation to self-interested regulators.
And the driving force of Congresss interest is apparent from some
of the other provisions of the McCain-Feingold Act that the Roberts
Court invalidated. Take the so-called Millionaires Amendment.
Although the average member of Congress is wealthier than the
average citizen,171 few are so wealthy that they can self-fund cam-
paigns. Yet there are over 10,000 households worth $100,000,000
that could likely self-fund a campaign completely,172 and hundreds
of thousands of wealthy individuals that could provide substantial
support for themselves. Aggregate limits can also entrench incum-
bents, because they prevent a contributor from aiding a lot of
challengers. They prevent contributors from helping incumbents as
well, but incumbents, as a matter of course, begin with a substantial
advantage of name recognition,173 and additional contributions are
thus likely to help them less at the margin.
Another characteristic test of the First Amendment is the require-
ment that the government show that even if there is a problem to be
solved, the infringement is burdening speech rights no more than is
necessary to solve it.174 Thus, the Court employs the so-called
169. See infra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
170. See Araiza, supra note 167, at 956-57 (arguing that nature of the doctrinal question
is the most important factor in determining the degree of expertise Congress should receive).
171. See Russ Choma, Millionaires Club: For First Time, Most Lawmakers Are Worth $1
Million-Plus, OPENSECRETS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/01/
millionaires-club-for-first-time-most-lawmakers-are-worth-1-million-plus/ [https://perma.cc/
96FD-2RJ4] (reporting that the 530 members of Congress had a median net worth of slightly
more than $1 million).
172. ReportsnReports, US HNWI Trends, Asset Allocation & Wealth Sector Challenges and
Opportunities, PITCHENGINE,http://pitchengine.com/pitches/cb09ba3d-76f7-4a78-af9d-2df18e
69ceb7 [https://perma.cc/XBS9-PE9T] (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
173. See Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 87 (1997)
(noting brand name advantage of incumbents).
174. See Brown v. Entmt Merchs. Assn, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) ([T]he curtailment
of free speech must be actually necessary to the solution.). It may be that the least restrictive
requirement applies only to content-based restrictions. But there is no doubt that campaign
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narrow tailoring test requiring the government to demonstrate why
alternatives with a less substantial burden on the exercise of free
speech rights would not accomplish the goals of the regulation.175
The Roberts campaign finance regulation majority put the govern-
ment to this burden of proof as well.
In McCutcheon, the government expressed concern that without
aggregate limits, contributors could circumvent individual limits
because the other candidates PACs could transfer money back to
candidates to whom the citizens had already donated.176 Moreover,
party organizations could funnel large sums donated to the party to
the preferred individual candidate.177 But Chief Justice Roberts
noted that Congress could impose restrictions on the transfer of
funds between committees, which would help prevent this result.178
He also observed that the FEC could tighten its earmark rules,
ensuring that money in certain PACs be given diffusely rather than
earmarked for particular candidates.179 Both provisions would make
itmore difficult to circumvent individual contribution limits without
interfering with a donors ability to express his support for multiple
candidates.
Moreover, the Chief Justice also pointed out that aggregate limits
undermined the professed objective of disclosure.180 Aggregate limits
had the perverse effect of encouraging the flow of campaign funds
into entities like 501(c)(4) organizations, to which contributions are
not required to be disclosed.181 The Court noted that, with the rise
of the Internet, disclosure itself was more of a constraint on corrup-
tion than ever before, thus implying that the effect of aggregate
limits was peculiarly perverse in our information age.182
finance restrictions are content based. Campaign finance regulations target only expenditures
related to politics. One can support messages on any other subject. Similarly, contributions
are restricted only if they are given to political campaigns and not to other activities.
175. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2422 (1996).
176. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1457 (2014).
177. See id. at 1454-55.
178. See id. at 1458-59.
179. See id. at 1459.
180. See id. at 1459-60.
181. See id. at 1460.
182. See id.
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The dissenters failure to test whether Congress is narrowly tai-
loring its means suggests that they are not willing to examine how
justified their trust in Congress is, because checking the means of
legislation against the objectives provides a metric for ascertaining
whether that legislation is actually aimed at the proclaimed objec-
tives. Even if the judiciarys inclination is to trust legislatures, it
should be open to verifying that trust.
As well as imposing a narrow tailoring test, the Roberts Court has
followed other First Amendment cases in assessing whether the leg-
islative solution in a campaign finance case is underinclusive or
overinclusive in relation to the problem it seeks to solve.183 One way
of understanding the under/overinclusiveness test is by focusing on
the fit between the proffered purpose of the legislation and its scope,
which helps to ferret out pretext and uncover legislation that claims
to solve a problem but is instead directed at an impermissible ob-
jective.184 If the legislation is underinclusive with respect to its
objective, the test suggests that the legislation is pretextual because
it does not solve the problem.185 If it is overinclusive, the test sug-
gests the legislation is burdening more speech rights than is
necessary because it applies regardless of whether the rationale for
the legislation is present.186
For instance, in Citizens United, the Court considered whether
the prohibition on corporate spending around an election fit one of
the claimed government objectives.187 The government urged that
prohibition of corporate expenditures around election time served
the interests of minority shareholders because it would prevent
them from funding speech with which they disagreed.188 But the
183. See Volokh, supra note 175, at 2420-23.
184. See Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochners Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence
of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV. 329, 427 (1995); see also J. Randy Beck, The Heart of
Federalism: Pretext Review of Means-End Relationships, 36 U.C. DAVIS L.REV. 407, 450 (2003)
(suggesting that underinclusiveness, and possibly overinclusiveness as well, are means of
ferreting out pretext). Another way of understanding the underinclusiveness test is that if a
statute is underinclusive, then the interest is not that compelling. See Volokh, supra note 175,
at 2420.
185. See Levy, supra note 184, at 427.
186. Thus, the overinclusiveness element of the test is not dissimilar to the least-
restrictive-means test discussed above. See Volokh, supra note 175, at 2423.
187. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 348-49 (2010).
188. See id. at 361-62.
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Court found that the governments asserted interest in protecting
minority shareholders was both under- and overinclusive.189 It was
underinclusive because minority shareholders would have an inter-
est in avoiding political expenditures with which they disagreed at
any time, not just around the time of an election.190 It was over-
inclusive because it covered corporations with just a single share-
holder who obviously would agree with the speech he had decided
to fund.191 Indeed, it would also cover nonprofit corporations estab-
lished by those who had come together for the precise objective of
advocating an electoral outcome.
It is hard to argue that legislatures are so much more trustworthy
in campaign finance regulation that the usual tests for substantial-
ity of interest and pretext should be abandoned.192 The failure to ap-
ply this established inquiry goes beyond presumptive deference193
and verges on blind trust.
3. The Nature of the First Amendment
But the most striking differences between the Roberts Courts
majority and dissenting opinions in campaign finance regulation
cases are even more fundamental. The Justices in the majority in
these cases reasserted that the First Amendment was defined by its
nature as a right exercised by private individuals and their organi-
zations.194 Thus, for the majority, the government interest in per-
fecting democracy did not help define the nature of the right, but
was evaluated only to see whether it was strong enough and
sufficiently connected to the legislative objective to trump the right.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. The Court rejected the underinclusiveness claim that the disclosure require-
ments were defective because they applied only to broadcast and not print or internet political
advertisements. See id. at 368.
192. All of the campaign finance regulations that the Roberts Court addressed were enact-
ed through regulation. Of course, it is possible that some states might enact regulation
through referendum. It is settled Supreme Court doctrine that this method of enactment will
make no difference to the Courts assessment of constitutionality. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803-05 (1995).
193. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 461 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (terming his own deference presumptive).
194. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 (2014).
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In contrast, Justice Breyer argued in McCutcheon for the dissenters
that the First Amendment is in part a collective right because it
is designed to connect the legislators to the sentiments of the
people.195 Such government interests should not be measured in
order to be weighed against the constitutional right to political
speech. Rather, they are interests rooted in the First Amendment
itself.196
The majoritys opinion in McCutcheon shows that its view is far
better rooted in free speech precedent and First Amendment struc-
ture than the dissents view. First, as the majority noted, traditional
First Amendment analysis considers the governmental interest in
some collective action only to assess if it justifies the restriction:
[S]uch restrictions are measured against the asserted public inter-
est (usually framed as an important or compelling governmental
interest).197 The majoritys conclusion here is supported by many
citations, but the dissent cited no cases in which the governmental
interest is used to define the scope of the First Amendment itself.198
Moreover, the majority observed that the First Amendment is a
right located in individuals and the entities that they organize.199 It
does not protect a majority acting through the government, even if
the interest proffered by the legislative majority is asserted to be in
the public interest.200 Indeed, the majority could have added that
Justice Breyers idea was in tension with the position of the First
Amendment in the Constitution. The First Amendment, along with
the other individual rights in the Bill of Rights, was passed as a
restriction on the federal legislature.
Justice Breyer offered some statements from the Founding Era
to support his view of the First Amendment as embodying a col-
lective right, but these materials undermine his claims. First, he
quoted a snippet from lectures by James Wilson on the Constitution,
through which he purported to demonstrate that Wilson believed
that [the] First Amendment ... would facilitate a chain of communi-
195. Id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id. at 1468.
197. Id. at 1450 (majority opinion).
198. See id. at 1466-67 (Breyer, J., dissenting); infra note 269 and accompanying text
(discussing cases that Justice Breyer used for support in McCutcheon).
199. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449-50.
200. See id.
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cation between the people and those, to whom they have committed
the exercise of the powers of government.201 Actually, the quote
from Wilson does not appear in a discussion of the First Amendment
as Justice Breyer implied; instead, it appears in a discussion of the
novelty and virtue of representative government as opposed to
monarchical, aristocratical and democratical forms of govern-
ment.202 Rejecting direct democracy, Wilson specifically notes in this
very discussion the necessity of a legislators freedom to vote at
variance with the sentiments of his constituents.203
Indeed, not only does this phrase have nothing to do with the
First Amendment, but the term communication is used here to
mean voting, not expression.204 That is clear from the next sentence
in the passage, a sentence which Justice Breyer failed to quote:
This chain may consist of one or more links; but in all cases it
should be sufficiently strong and discernible.205 In the context of
discussing the nature of electoral representation, Wilsons meaning
is that representation may be direct (one vote between the people
and choice of representative) or indirect, like the Constitutions own
establishment of the electoral college (at least two votes between the
people and the choice of representative).206 Justice Breyer appears
not to understand the larger context of his quotation.
Justice Breyer also quoted James Madison in support, noting that
Madison states that citizens could use their First Amendment rights
to publicly address their representatives or privately advise
them.207 Of course, this view is hardly a surprise; who could think
that citizens could not use their right of free speech in this way? But
201. Id. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting JAMES WILSON & THOMAS MCKEAN,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 30-31 (London, J.
Debrett 1792)).
202. JAMES WILSON & THOMAS MCKEAN, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 29-31 (London, J. Debrett 1792).
203. Id. at 27.
204. See id. at 30-31.
205. Id. at 31.
206. State legislatures decide the manner of choosing the electoral college. See U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1, cl. 2. These electors then determine the election of the President by their vote. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XII. Thus, the election of the President has at least two links in the
chain of communication in Wilsons sense. See WILSON & MCKEAN, supra note 202, at 30-31.
207. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting T.
BENTON, 1 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO 1856, at 141 (New York,
D. Appleton & Co. 1857)).
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what is notable is the context of the comments, again omitted by
Justice Breyer. Madison is opposing an amendment to the First
Amendment that would have entitled citizens to instruct their rep-
resentatives on how to vote.208 Thus, Madison is actually arguing
against a provision that would have required representatives to
reflect more closely the sentiments of the people.
The larger context certainly does not support, and in fact under-
mines, Justice Breyers point that the governments representatives
may regulate expression to make what they claim is a closer connec-
tion between representatives and the people. Justice Breyer also
failed to put Madisons comments here in the larger context of
Madisons understanding of the nature of the First Amendment.
Madison elsewhere stated clearly and emphatically that he believed
that the Amendment reflects the right of the individual, not of the
collective:
[Property] in its particular application means that dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of
the world, in exclusion of every other individual.
In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces every thing to
which a man may attach a value and have a right; and which
leaves to every one else the like advantage.
In the former sense, a mans land, or merchandize, or money
is called his property.
In the latter sense, a man has a property in his opinions and
the free communication of them.
He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions,
and in the profession and practice dictated by them.
He has a property very dear to him in the safety and liberty
of his person.
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and
free choice of the objects on which to employ them.
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he
may be equally said to have a property in his rights....
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as
well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that
which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of
208. See T. BENTON, 1 ABRIDGMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS, FROM 1789 TO 1856, at
138 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857) (noting introduction of amendment in favor of
instruc[tion]).
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government, that alone is a just government, which impartially
secures to every man, whatever is his own.209
Madison thus understood free speech as a natural right of the indi-
vidual, not a collective right for government.
Justice Breyer also found support for his claims about the mean-
ing of the First Amendment in Rousseau and his notion of the
general will.210 But Rousseau had little, if any, influence on any
provision of the Constitution, let alone the First Amendment.211 In
fact, some of the Founders who did know him thought his theories
mad, bad, and dangerous.212 For that reason, he has never been
cited in a majority opinion of the Supreme Court. Thus, Justice
Breyers effort to find support for a revolution in First Amendment
doctrine is alternately misleading and silly. It is far from the kind
of evidence about the original meaning of the Constitution that
would warrant changing the nature of free speech analysis.213
4. Arizona Free Enterprise Club
As discussed above, Arizona Free Enterprise Club concerned
whether the government could provide additional funds to candi-
dates because they were running against a candidate who was
spending money of his own.214 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the
209. James Madison, Property, NATL GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). For further discussion of
Madisons understanding of free speech as an individual right of property and other sources
of support for this understanding during the Framing period, see John O. McGinnis, The Once
and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 56-57, 64-71
(1996).
210. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing J. ROUSSEAU, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 265-66 (transl. 1791)).
211. See Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-
Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 189, 194 tbl.3 (1984); see also
Nelson Lund, Rousseau and Direct Democracy (with a Note on the Supreme Courts Term
Limits Decision), 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 459, 459, 460 & n.5 (2004) (discussing
Rousseau and American constitutional thought).
212. 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 103
(Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1856) (commenting unfavorably on
theories of Rousseau).
213. Justice Breyer also relied on ROBERT POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION (2014). See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1468 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting). The book is discussed infra at note 375.
214. Ariz. Free Enter. Clubs Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011).
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majority, believed that Davis governed this case because, as with
the Millionaires Amendment, the Arizona scheme also burdened
free speech rights by making the exercise of speech rights trigger
adverse consequences to the speaker.215 The arguments for the
unconstitutionality of the Millionaires Amendment were deeply
rooted in First Amendment doctrine outside of the campaign finance
regulation context.216 If the government imposed a tax on someones
First Amendment expression, that would be an abridgement.217
Providing additional privileges to an opponentas did the Million-
aires Amendment by relaxing the opponents contribution limits
penalizes and deters expression no less than a tax and thus also
constitutes an abridgement.
Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the Arizona scheme
burdened First Amendment rights by triggering government
subsidies for opponents of those exercising their rights.218 Indeed,
the Court found that the burden was greater than that in Davis in
three separate ways.219 First, in Davis, opposing candidates were
given only additional opportunities to raise funds, but in Arizona
Free Enterprise Club, they were actually given funds.220 Second, the
additional public subsidies provided by the scheme could create a
multiplier effect: when there is more than one opponent, all
opponents get more public money to counter the candidate making
private expenditures.221 Third, the candidate who uses private con-
tributions cannot even control whether he will face additional public
expenditures, because independent expenditures on his behalf will
trigger additional public expenditures for his opponents.222
Justice Kagans dissent, however, argued that the case simply
concerned a public subsidy and thus should be understood as consti-
tutional under traditional free speech doctrine permitting such
subsidies.223 To the argument that these subsidies are not triggered
by the exercise of First Amendment rights, Justice Kagan argued
215. See id at 2818.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 2818-19.
219. See id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2819.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 2830 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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that the government could have chosen to furnish greater subsidies
in the first place without violating the First Amendment,224 and that
the trigger mechanism helps the government to calibrate the
appropriate level of a subsidy for a particular race.225
Justice Kagans analysis has been widely regarded as a powerful
dissent,226 and it gains its strength from its claim to root its analysis
in neutral First Amendment principles, thus distinguishing it from
many of the other dissents in Roberts Court campaign finance
regulation cases. Nevertheless, she does not have the better of the
doctrinal arguments.
As Justice Kagan herself recognized when she was Professor
Kagan, government action can be simultaneously a subsidy and a
penalty.227 The distinction depends on the perspective of the person
whose behavior is being affected. To the recipient of public funds
for campaign expenditures, the trigger is a subsidy. But to the can-
didate using his own funds, the trigger is a penalty because it
results in more opportunities for opposing speech. Such a trigger
makes the candidate (or entity making an independent expenditure
on the candidates behalf) less likely to exercise First Amendment
rights. This effect is self-evident if the trigger results in a tax: if one
taxes an activity, there will likely be less of the activity.228 Similarly,
if an activity triggers an event that will result in other untoward
consequences for the actoreven if they are not monetarythere
will also likely be less of the activity. Thus, such a scheme should be
held to be unconstitutional under principles the Court has previ-
ously embraced outside the campaign context.
Nor is the scheme saved by the fact that Arizona could have
chosen higher levels of subsidies. This contention offers a classic
greater-includes-the-lesser argument: because the government can
224. See id. at 2839.
225. See id. at 2842.
226. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 317, 318
(2012).
227. See Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v St.
Paul, Rust v Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 SUP. CT. REV.
29, 46-47 (recognizing that the penalty/subsidy distinction depends on the perspective taken);
see also John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1150 (2005) (same).
228. Levying a tax on a First Amendment activity would be self-evidently unconstitutional.
See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Commr of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 576-77, 593
(1983) (finding a statute unconstitutional that imposed a special tax on newspapers through
taxation of paper and ink products).
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fund at higher levels generally, it should be able to do so on a
selective basis. But classic, greater-includes-the-lesser arguments
are not compatible with First Amendment doctrine.229 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes provided the first famous version of such an
argument in dismissing the First Amendment claim of a public
employee: The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.230 But
the Supreme Court has long rejected that logic in the context of free
speech and public employment.231 Similarly, it has rejected the
argument that because the government could ban a commercial
activity altogether, it can ban commercial speech about that activ-
ity.232 The reason for rejecting such arguments is that a lesser power
may be more offensive than the greater because its exercise may
target speech.
Finally, it is useful to consider the trigger in a First Amendment
context other than campaign finance regulation to confirm its con-
demnation. Assume that Congress passed a law that provided
subsidies for a newspaper dedicated by law to rebutting any editor-
ial written by any newspaper that spent over a certain threshold of
money for its operations, capturing perhaps only the ten largest
newspapers in the United States. Indeed, to make it better resemble
the campaign finance regulation issue in Arizona Free Enterprise
Club, perhaps the government should subsidize two newspapers in
opposition to each private one, because a candidate expending his
or her private funds may have many opponents. In this noncam-
paign context, it is obvious that the government is clearly burdening
the rights of newspapers by setting up newspapers expressly to
229. See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV.
589, 600 (1996) (showing that greater-includes-the-lesser doctrine would justify suppressing
speech advocating overthrow of the government because the government can constitutionally
prevent its own overthrow).
230. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892); see Frank H.
Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. L. REV. 905, 916 (1990) (seeing this opinion as
a classic example of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument).
231. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 395 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (The Court
long ago rejected Justice Holmes approach to the free speech rights of public employees, that
[a policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman. (quoting McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517)).
232. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 511 (1996) (plurality opinion);
id. at 534 (OConnor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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rebut them. The result should be no different in the context of a
campaign.
5. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar
In Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, Chief Justice Roberts upheld
the Florida Bars restriction on personal solicitation by candidates
on the ground that it was narrowly tailored to the compelling state
interest of ensuring the public integrity of the judiciary.233 Lanell
Williams-Yulee had mailed and posted online a letter soliciting
contributions for her campaign to be a judge.234 After her election
defeat, the Florida Bar disciplined her for violating its rule forbid-
ding personal solicitations.235 The Chief Justice acknowledged that
Williams-Yulee was engaged in pure speech and thus the State had
to meet the compelling interest standard.236 The dissent readily
agreed with that proposition.237 And it is hardly a surprise: asking
for support for a campaign, including monetary support, is speech
indeed, core political speechand thus targeting prohibitions on
that speech requires strict scrutiny. Both the plurality and the
dissent rooted their decisions in ample First Amendment precedent
outside the context of campaign finance regulation.
In contrast, Justice Ginsburg advocated for a less exacting stan-
dard in her concurrence.238 Had the Court adopted that standard, it
would have had to overrule a previous case, Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, which applied compelling interest protection to
judicial electioneering speech unconnected to the solicitation of
funds.239 And the dissent had no support in other free speech cases
for the proposition that solicitation of donations was not pure po-
litical speech. Thus, this aspect of Williams-Yulee again shows that
a majority of Justicesalthough not the majority that supported the
233. See 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1673 (2015).
234. Id. at 1663.
235. Id. at 1663-64.
236. See id. at 1665.
237. See id. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Kennedy and Alito did not directly join
the primary dissent but said they largely agreed with it. See id. at 1682 (Kennedy, J., dis-
senting); id. at 1685 (Alito, J., dissenting).
238. See id. at 1673 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
239. See 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002).
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result in this casewere following established First Amendment
law in their choice of the standard of review.
Moreover, all the Justices agreed that Floridas interest in
ensuring judicial impartiality and the appearance of impartiality
was potentially compelling. The plurality and dissent disagreed on
whether the rule was narrowly tailored to that goal. The dissent
noted several problems it saw in this respect. First, the ban was
overinclusive because it applied to fundraising appeals that went to
those who were neither litigants nor attorneys.240 Second, it was
underinclusive because it did not apply to requests for anything
other than campaign contributions, such as personal loans.241 The
dissent also objected that there was little evidence that, in a
structure that permitted campaign contributions in the first place,
banning requests substantially advanced the interest in judicial
impartiality.242
The Chief Justices opinion answered these objections. The ban
was not overinclusive: the idea of limiting restrictions to people who
were neither litigants nor attorneys was unworkable because it was
unclear who would appear in those capacities.243 The prohibition
also was not fatally underinclusive because it applied to all gifts
given for the purpose of influencing a judge, and thus, problematic
gifts outside campaign contributions were already covered.244
Finally, the Chief Justice suggested that personal appeals by judges
have inherent dangers, including creating fears of retaliation for
those who do not donate and the spectacle of the direct passing of
money.245 According to the Chief Justice, the judiciary is very dif-
ferent from a legislature in this respect: it is supposed to apply the
law fearlessly and thus be unresponsive to particular citizens
wishes.246 Thus, the plurality and the dissent did not so much dis-
agree on the nature of the tests to be applied as on their application
to the facts of the case.
240. See Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1679 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
241. See id. at 1680-81.
242. See id. at 1678.
243. See id. at 1670-71 (plurality opinion).
244. See id. at 1668-69.
245. See id. at 1667-68.
246. See id. at 1666.
2016] CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROBLEMS 887
Moreover, Williams-Yulee conceded,247 and the dissent did not
disagree, that direct in-person requests for donations from litigants
and attorneys could be banned.248 Conversely, the plurality relied for
the constitutionality of the rule on the capacity of a judges cam-
paign committee to make such requests on behalf of that judicial
candidate.249 Thus, the difference between what the plurality and
dissent would permit in judicial elections is actually very narrow.
Under the holding of the case, personal requests for judicial cam-
paign donations may be prohibited, but campaign committees can
make exactly the same requests. Even if one believes, as I do, that
the dissent, in applying doctrine to the facts of the case, had the
better argument, the specific holding is less important than the
principles embraced by a majority of the Justices.
In short, Williams-Yulee is largely consistent with the view that
the Roberts Court has been applying more general First Amend-
ment principles to the campaign finance area. The plurality and
dissent agreed on these principles even if their judgments diverged
on how they should be applied. Even then, the difference in appli-
cation was one of degreeand not a large degree at that. It was the
concurrence by Justice Ginsburg that was most out of line with the
Roberts Courts general approach to campaign finance regulation.
And that is not a surprise because both Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer have consistently wanted to apply different First Amend-
ment standards to political campaigns.
6. Citations to First Amendment Cases
A final way of understanding the majoritys greater integration
of campaign finance regulation into the rest of First Amendment
law is simply to compare the number of citations to First Amend-
ment cases in the majority or principal plurality decisions with
those in the principal dissenting opinions in the cases in which the
Court split on the principles at stake.250 Taken together over these
six cases, the majority or plurality opinions cited First Amendment
cases outside the campaign finance regulation area seventy-eight
247. See id. at 1670.
248. See id. at 1676-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 1670 (plurality opinion).
250. Thus, I do not count Williams-Yulee. See supra Part I.B.5.
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times.251 The principal dissents cited such cases thirty-eight
times.252 The difference approximates two to one. Even this count
understates the imbalance. As the Roberts Court has infused First
Amendment principles into campaign finance regulation decisions,
the decisions themselves become more representative of general
First Amendment principles. When these previous Roberts Court
cases are then cited in later cases, they bring with them an infusion
of general free speech principles.253
In three of the cases, the divergence in citation to First Amend-
ment cases outside the context of campaign finance regulation was
overwhelming. In Wisconsin Right to Life, the plurality cited ten
First Amendment cases outside the campaign finance regulation
area while the dissent cited none.254 In Citizens United, the majority
cited forty-six such cases, and the dissent cited twenty-one.255 In
McCutcheon, the plurality cited thirteen such First Amendment
cases while the dissent cited to three.256
In Randall, neither the majority nor the principal dissent cited
any First Amendment cases outside of the campaign finance regula-
tion context. This failure is not surprising because of all such cases
decided by the Roberts Court, this case broke the least new ground
and could easily be decided within the Buckley framework. More-
over, Justice Breyer, the author of Randall, dissented in every other
such case decided by the Roberts Court.
In Davis, the majority and principal dissent each cited to only one
prior First Amendment case outside the context of campaign finance
regulation.257 The reason for the paucity of citations in the majority
251. See infra Citation Appendix. The methodology of constructing the Citation Appendix
is straightforward. Any citation in the cases surveyed to a free speech case that was not
related to campaign finance was catalogued and counted. It did not matter whether the
citation appeared in a string cite or was discussed in the opinion. The wide net seems appro-
priate, because the idea behind the Appendix is to assess how closely nested a campaign
finance opinion is in the network of other free speech cases. The Citation Appendix lists cited
cases in order of their appearance in the opinions.
252. See infra Citation Appendix.
253. For example, the majority cited a First Amendment case to justify Davis, and then the
same majority believed the analysis in Davis governed Arizona Free Enterprise Club. See
supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
254. See infra Citation Appendix.
255. See infra Citation Appendix.
256. See infra Citation Appendix.
257. See infra Citation Appendix.
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was that this result flowed from a relatively straightforward appli-
cation of Buckleys constitutional protection for unlimited candidate
expenditures on his behalf.258 But it is important to note that the
one case cited by Justice Stevenss dissent, Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, is one of the most criticized First Amendment cases in
the modern eraand is likely not even good law.259 Red Lion upheld
the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine, which required
broadcasters to give each side of public issues fair coverage.260 One
of the rationales for the Red Lion Courts conclusion was the
scarcity of the broadcasting spectrum.261 Given scarcity in the
medium, the claim was that this requirement of balanced treatment
was needed to make sure that individuals with opposing views could
find a way to express themselves.262 Subsequently, the FCC repealed
that doctrine, expressing concerns about its constitutionality, partic-
ularly given the rise of cable and other media that undermined the
scarcity rationale.263 Because of the Internet and cornucopia of med-
ia today, the scarcity rationale is even less persuasive.264 Even ac-
cepting the premise of scarcity, Red Lion has been heavily criticized
because a free market facilitates efficient allocation despite
scarcity.265 In light of the widespread criticism and anachronism of
258. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
259. See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 156 (2d ed.
1998) (Although the Supreme Court has not abandoned Red Lion, the FCC has abandoned
the fairness doctrine and challenged most of the justifications asserted in the Red Lion opin-
ion.).
260. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369, 396 (1969). The fairness doctrine re-
quired broadcast radio and television licensees to provide coverage of vitally important
controversial issues of interest in the community served by the licensees and to provide a
reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints on such issues. Inquiry
into Section 73.1910 of the Commns Rules & Regulations Concerning the Gen. Fairness Doc-
trine Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 142, 146 (1985).
261. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (suggesting the characteristics of broadcasting, includ-
ing the scarcity of the broadcasting spectrum, supported the constitutionality of the fairness
doctrine).
262. See id.
263. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5051 (1987).
264. See, e.g., Josephine Soriano, The Digital Transition and the First Amendment: Is It
Time to Reevaluate Red Lions Scarcity Rationale?, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 341, 355-56 (2006)
(noting the disappearance of the scarcity rationale).
265. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 137-38 (1990). Richard Posner called the idea that scarcity
causes less than optimal production of speech economic nonsense. RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 943 (8th ed. 2001).
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Red Lion, Justice Stevenss citation of Red Lion actually distances
the Davis dissenters from current First Amendment principles.
The one case in which the number of First Amendment citations
by the dissent is larger than that of the majority is Arizona Free
Enterprise Club, by thirteen to eight.266 The imbalance, however, is
not as large as that in Citizens United, and not anywhere approx-
imating Wisconsin Right to Life or McCutcheon.267 As previously
noted, the Arizona Free Enterprise Club dissent is the most plaus-
ible of the campaign finance regulation dissents in the Roberts
Court.268 This count helps confirm that this plausibility comes from
the relative rootedness of its analysis in the general First Amend-
ment, as the overall citation analysis confirms the conclusion that
the Roberts Court majority is overall better rooted in traditional
First Amendment doctrine than are the dissenters.269
266. See infra Citation Appendix.
267. See infra Citation Appendix.
268. See supra Part I.B.4.
269. It is also the case that some of the First Amendment citations by the dissenters are
quite distant from demonstrating current First Amendment principles that cut concretely in
favor of their positions. For instance, in McCutcheon, Justice Breyer relied on two First
Amendment cases from seventy years ago as support for his view that the First Amendment
is a collective right. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1467 (2014) (Breyer, J., dis-
senting). First, he noted that Justice Brandeis, in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), stated that the protection of speech was essential to effective
democracy.McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Whitney, 274
U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring)). He also observed that Chief Justice Hughes stated in
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), that [a] fundamental principle of our constitu-
tional system is the maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end
that government may be responsive to the will of the people. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1467
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 369). But these
general sentiments hardly seem strong enough to support his position. Neither Justice
Brandeis nor Justice Hughes opined that the First Amendment was not a right that should
be defined by its private exercise, rather than its effect on public governance. Justice Brandeis
expressly said otherwise. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (comparing
free speech to other fundamental rights like the right to teach). Justice Hughess decision
invalidated a statute that tried to prevent an individuals expression of opposition to organ-
ized government. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 361, 369-70. Neither case provides support for
government interference with free speech to prevent undue influence, promote equality, or
any other objective of campaign finance regulation. It seems especially odd to use some very
general dicta in Justice Hughess opinion to empower government regulation when the
opinion was notable, particularly at its time, for overturning regulation of expression.
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7. Moving Further Toward Neutral Principles in Campaign
Finance
While the Roberts Court majority has made progress in applying
neutral principles to campaign finance law, one more important step
remains to be taken: campaign contributions still need to be better
integrated with the rest of First Amendment law. This Section will
describe three steps that need to be taken to complete the integra-
tion. First, the Court needs to better articulate the reason that the
restrictions on campaign contributions deserve First Amendment
scrutiny is that these limitations are targeted at campaigns, which
are themselves quintessentially expressive activities. But such scru-
tiny does not necessarily mean that those limitations are impermis-
sible so long as they remain content neutral. Thus, the second step
is to decide whether the government objective for restriction is per-
missible and content neutral. Third, assuming it is permissible and
content neutral, the regulation of campaign contributions must still
be narrowly tailored and allow for alternative avenues for participa-
tion in campaigns.270 Although what the McCutcheon majority (in
judgment) said is largely consistent with this approach, the doctrin-
al structure needs to be put on more secure theoretical foundations.
Perhaps the Roberts Court has had trouble setting the right con-
ceptual relation of contributions to the First Amendment because
Buckley was not particularly articulate about why contributions
raise First Amendment problems. It is true, as Buckley suggested,
that contributions help facilitate speech,271 but so do many other
things, like transportation, and yet regulations of these nonexpres-
sive activities do not implicate the First Amendment. The reason
that limitations on campaign contributions implicate the First
Amendment is that they are regulations differentially targeted at
campaigns, which are inherently expressive.272 Thus, while cam-
270. Eugene Volokh has nicely set out such an analysis. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Speech About Political Candidates: The Unintended Consequences of Three Propos-
als, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 47 (2000).
271. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (While contributions may result in
political expression ... the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech
by someone other than the contributor.).
272. See Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 23-24, 33
(2016).
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paign contribution ceilings limit nonexpressive conduct, the regu-
lation is targeted on the basis of its relation to expressive conduct.273
Participation in campaigns is expressive activity for both the
contributor and the candidate. A campaign is a joint enterprise
between candidates and supporters in which each seeks to express
himselfthe candidate by campaigning, the supporter by choosing
the campaign to support. Indeed, supporters influence the expres-
sive nature of the campaign, and candidates naturally try to get
more of them by taking into account their interests. Thus, by target-
ing contributions to campaigns, the government makes both the
interests of the candidate and the contributor relevant to First
Amendment analysis.
As usual, the best way of understanding why a campaign finance
regulation triggers First Amendment scrutiny is to analogize it to
similar restrictions outside of the context of campaign regulations.
For instance, the Court has applied First Amendment scrutiny to
special taxes on nonexpressive items, like materials to put out a
newspaper, because those taxes are targeted at expressive activ-
ity.274 Even more analogously, if the government were to put a
ceiling on the contributions to magazines of political opinion, or in-
deed, aesthetic opinion, that limitation would also fall on nonexpres-
sive financial activities. Yet, it would be targeted at an expressive
activity and require First Amendment scrutiny. And because a
political magazine reflects both the interests of its owners and the
contributors that choose to keep it afloat, regulations that target
monetary contributions to the magazine implicate both their inter-
ests. It should now be easier to clearly see this, as more recent First
Amendment law has been making its scrutiny under the First
273. It is true that campaigns do things other than express themselves. For instance, they
try to conduct demographic research and get voters to the polls. But a huge proportion of
campaign contributions are spent on expressive purposes. A regulation restricting contribu-
tions to opinion magazines would still deserve First Amendment scrutiny, even if some of
those contributions were spent on market research. Perhaps the campaign finance law could
restrict contributions spent on nonexpressive activities without engendering any First Amend-
ment scrutiny, but campaign finance law generally does not make such a distinction. See infra
note 275 and accompanying text.
274. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Commr of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 593
(1983) (overturning use tax on newsprint that applied to papers).
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Amendment of nonexpressive activity depend on whether regulation
of that activity is based on its relation to expressive activity.275
The fact that the limitation of campaign contributions implicates
the First Amendment does not necessarily make that limitation
unconstitutional, but it does create certain doctrinal hoops through
which the regulation must jumpdoctrines that McCutcheon cor-
rectly applied. First, the government must seek an objective that is
itself permissible.276 Equalizing speech opportunities is not permis-
sible, because that is a justification that itself targets speech.
Preventing quid pro quos between candidates and contributions is
a legitimate purpose because bribery is an activity that is legiti-
mately punished and targeted at speech. Thus, McCutcheons sound
advance in doctrinal analysis on this point is to hold that expanding
the quid pro quo justification to influence or access to politicians is
not a permissible reason.277 And that conclusion is right. To use the
example of the noncampaign-finance activity described above, it
would obviously be impermissible to cap the contributions to polit-
ical magazines for fear that the magazines or their contributors
would gain influence or access, because that too is targeting speech.
It is a legitimate purpose of speech to gain influence and a hearing
for the ideas expressed.
Second, even if the objective is permissible, the regulation must
be content neutral and narrowly tailored to meet that objective.
Here, McCutcheon is again instructive. The difficulty in that case
was that the aggregate limits were not narrowly tailored to achieve
their objective,278 as is required even of content-neutral regulations
targeted at speech. It would have been useful if McCutcheon had
cited more generally to cases outside of the campaign contribution
context that make this point. For instance, Ward v. Rock Against
Racism made clear that restrictions on sound at political rallies
must be narrowly tailored to prevent the evil complained ofthere,
excessive noisewithout tamping down too much on speech.279
275. See Campbell, supra note 272, at 1.
276. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
278. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1457-59 (noting that the government could have pre-
vented the use of aggregate limits to circumvent individual limits by others means).
279. See 491 U.S. 781, 791, 803 (1989).
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Third, even content-neutral regulations must leave sufficient al-
ternatives for expression. McCutcheon contributes some relevant
context to the analysis for campaign regulations by noting that most
citizens, unlike entertainers and celebrities, do not have alternative
avenues by which to convey their support for multiple candidates
other than by contributions.280
That last part of the doctrinal framework may become relevant to
future challenges to campaign contribution limits for individual
campaignschallenges that are already being made.281 Before the
Court in Citizens United permitted citizens to use the corporate ve-
hicle for independent expenditures282 and lower courts, relying in
part on Citizens United, legitimated Super PACs,283 it was difficult
for citizens of more modest means to make their voices heard on
behalf of a particular candidate. But now they have the ability to
give unlimited amounts of money for independent expenditures that
will make the case on behalf of that candidate. This capacity weak-
ens the argument that individual contribution limits are too low.
Now there are alternative means of supporting a candidate without
creating a substantial danger of quid pro quo corruption.
However, joining together in either corporate form or through
Super PACs is not a perfect substitute for campaign contributions
to candidates themselves. Independent expenditures on behalf of a
candidate cannot be coordinated with a candidate and thus do not
perform exactly the same function as contributions controlled by the
candidate, which are focused on the candidates message. But there
may well be a sufficient substitute once a supporter is allowed to
contribute a reasonable amount directly to the candidate. Thus, it
is not necessarily the case that all of the developments in the
Roberts Court campaign finance jurisprudence should lead to relax-
ation of campaign finance strictures. Limits on individual campaign
contributions may be a case in point.284
280. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1449.
281. See, e.g., Lair v. Murry, 903 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Mont. 2012), revd and remanded sub
nom. Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing district court decision striking
down Montanas statutory contribution limits, and remanding to the district court to decide
whether the limits further a valid important state interest).
282. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).
283. See supra text accompanying notes 123-28.
284. Another area that could be better integrated with the rest of the First Amendment is
disclosure of campaign contributions. Unlike other areas of campaign finance law, most
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II. THE NEED FOR NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES IN CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REGULATION
The idea that the judiciary must decide its cases according to
neutral principles became central to American constitutional juris-
prudence in the twentieth century.285 Precisely because at this time
the Supreme Court exercised a more robust power of judicial review
than at previous times in its history, the Court had to establish its
Justices are not divided on the permissibility of disclosure or disclaimers that require adver-
tisements funded by independent expenditures to declare who is responsible for them. All of
the current Justices except Justice Thomas believe that the legislature can require disclosures
and disclaimers, unless releasing that information is likely to lead to harassment. Compare
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368-71, with id. at 483-85 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). This conclusion may well be right with respect to contributions. If
preventing quid pro quo corruption is a substantial government interest, disclosure may be
required to police it. This position is not inconsistent with the Courts approach to disclosing
membership in an expressive association. Outside the electoral context, the Court employs
much the same test. See NAACP v. Alabama exrel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958) (not-
ing that interest of Alabama was insubstantial in determining eligibility). In Patterson, the
Court held unconstitutional an Alabama statute that required the NAACP to provide lists of
its members in order to prove eligibility to do business in the state. See id. at 466. In the
climate of that time, with Jim Crow laws and other official antagonisms toward African
Americans, requiring disclosure was clearly meant for harassment. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 383 (2004) (noting that Alabama had succeeded in shutting down the NAACP for
eight years, including the years during which the litigation over disclosure took place). The
Court nevertheless affirmed that governmental interests could justify disclosure in other
circumstances. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460, 462.
But it is far from clear that the Court has fully reconciled requiring disclosure of indepen-
dent expenditures with other First Amendment law. Disclosing the identity of independent
expenditures is tantamount to disclosing the identity of the speaker. But the Court has
expressly held that there is a right to anonymous speech. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commn, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (invalidating an Ohio law that prohibited anonymous
campaign literature). Perhaps one way to reconcile the requirement of disclosure of those
making independent expenditures with the anonymous speech holding is to observe that
disclosure is needed to ensure that independent expenditures are not coordinated with a
candidates campaign. Coordination would make independent expenditures essentially the
equivalent of contributions, raising the problems of quid pro quo corruption. But even if fear
of coordination provides a justification for disclosure to government agencies, it would not
justify requiring people or organizations to identify themselves in campaign ads. This require-
ment would be in substantial tension with the right to anonymous speech.
285. See generally Eldon J. Eisenach, Can Liberalism Still Tell Powerful Stories?, in 11 THE
EUROPEAN LEGACY: TOWARD NEW PARADIGMS 47, 48 (2006) (discussing the rise of neutral
principles in the mid-twentieth century).
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legitimacy in overturning the judgments of the political branches.286
One source of legitimacy was the nature of its decision making. In
defending the Constitution, it was not to act in the ad hoc manner
of ordinary politics.287 Instead, the Court was to render decisions
according to reasoned elaboration of constitutional principles.288
Reason meant applying constitutional principles of content
generality and equal applicability.289 As Martin Redish has written,
neutral principles require that whatever rationale a court selects
to justify its chosen interpretive doctrine must be applied consis-
tently in all cases; it cannot be selectively altered in subsequent
cases solely because the court finds the outcome dictated by use of
that principle to be politically distasteful or offensive.290 Thus, a
decision should not depend on the identity of the parties, or even on
the nature of the particular dispute, but rather on principles that
transcend the dispute and the nature of the parties.291 These neutral
principles guaranteed the political neutrality essential to establish-
ing the judiciarys comparative advantage over the political branch-
es in adjudicating cases under the Constitution.
The requirement of neutral principles has particular purchase in
First Amendment lawespecially in the campaign finance regula-
tion areafor three reasons. First, while most constitutional
disputes are about specific substantive results, First Amendment
disputes bear directly on the political process that determines
substantive results across the entire legislative policy space. Thus,
286. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A View from Cen-
turys End, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1999) (arguing that an overriding purpose of neutral
principles was to constrain judicial discretion).
287. See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 672-73 (1993).
288. See id.
289. Herbert Wechslers Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.L.REV.
1, 19 (1959), is the classic statement of the position. He argued for a process based on
generality and neutrality, which transcend[s] any immediate result that is involved. Id.
290. Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the
Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 77 (2007).
291. See Wechsler, supra note 289, at 15, 19. What was controversial about Wechslers arti-
cle was that it suggested that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), could not be
justified along the lines of neutral principles. See id. at 22, 26, 32-34. But the argument for
neutral principles can be separated from the argument against Brown. And it was so
separated, as a variety of commentators argued that Brown could be justified in terms of the
neutral principle of antisubordination. See Barry Friedman, Neutral Principles: A Retrospec-
tive, 50 VAND. L. REV. 503, 531 (1997).
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if the Supreme Court does not apply neutral principles, it will not
only be engaging in ad hoc decision making itself, but it also will be
systematically distorting the entire range of decision making of the
political branches.
Second, the First Amendment is premised on a view that the
government cannot be trusted with decisions about speech.292 But
even though judges themselves are government officials, the Court
necessarily has to make decisions about when and how the First
Amendment will apply. Given the special problems of trust in this
area, the Court has a particular need to make its decisions accord-
ing to neutral principles in order to make its method of interpreta-
tion reflect the underlying nature of the Amendment. The more a
constitutional provision reflects an economy of distrust, the more it
requires judicial constraint,293 which adherence to neutral principles
can provide. In other words, where there are reasons to believe that
trust in those interpreting the law should be low, constraint on
discretion is even more necessary.294
Third, campaign regulations are conceived by politicians who
strive for reelection and the defeat of their opponents. The members
of the Supreme Court are appointed through a political process
dominated by these same politicians. To dispel the appearance of
partisanship, it is particularly important to show that the Courts
campaign finance regulation jurisprudence follows neutral First
Amendment principles.
If there are more powerful reasons to apply neutral principles to
campaign regulation, it is also easier to do. The Court has returned
to the subject of free speech again and again, laying down a
reticulated set of principles in a variety of contexts that have lower
political stakes than campaign finance regulation.295 Such principles
forged outside the hurly-burly of partisan politics are available to
guide judicial decision making.
292. See Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 41, 48 (1992). There would be little reason to single out free speech as an individual right
beyond government control if one trusted the government with its management.
293. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 346 (2011).
294. See id.
295. For instance, a study showed that between 1993 and 2002, the Court decided more
free speech cases than any other category of cases in constitutional law other than criminal
procedure cases. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Prelim-
inary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1792 n.139 (2004).
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Thus, it counts heavily in favor of the Roberts Courts jurispru-
dence that it follows neutral principles by uniting campaign finance
regulation analysis with the rest of the free speech jurisprudence.
Part I has shown that the majority does a far better job of integra-
tion at a variety of levelsfrom the simple doctrinal unity, to the
deployment of similar tests for evaluating compelling interests, to
the fundamental structure of First Amendment analysis.296
One possible argument against the Roberts Courts adherence to
neutral principles is that the majority did overrule some precedents.
By holding that a corporation had a right to make independent
expenditures, the Court in Citizens United overruled Austin and
portions of McConnell.297 By holding that aggregate limits of cam-
paign contributions were unconstitutional, the Court in McCutcheon
departed from some language in Buckley.298 But following prece-
dents is not the same as adhering to neutral principles if the
precedents themselves are outliers to the principles forged else-
where in case law.299 Otherwise, the law would, in fact, come to be
unprincipled, as the judiciary would have to choose between prece-
dents reflecting incompatible principles.
In particular, while Citizens United overruled Austin and
McConnell, it brought the First Amendment into line with far more
established and pervasive lines of cases that asserted that corpora-
tions possessed the same rights as individuals.300 Citizens United
also followed the language and purpose of the First Amendment,
which offers no foothold for the distinction between individual
speech and joint speechthat is, speech determined by individuals
but facilitated by mechanisms of association.301
McCutcheon did not even overrule any holding of Buckley because
campaign finance law had changed substantially. Buckley had up-
held the overall ceilings as prevent[ing] evasion of the $1,000
[individual] contribution limitation by a person who might other-
wise contribute massive amounts of money to a particular candidate
296. See supra Part I.
297. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378-85 (2010).
298. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1445 (2014).
299. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 723, 759 n.200 (1988) (stating that precedents that are inconsistent with widely
applicable principles may be overruled).
300. See supra text accompanying note 297.
301. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
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through the use of unearmarked contributions to political commit-
tees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to
the candidates political party.302 As the McCutcheon Court ex-
plained, there are now new limitations on circumvention in place.303
Moreover, in applying the least restrictive means test to this new
ceiling in a different campaign finance regime, the Court was
following tests applied in other areas of First Amendment law.304
Thus, it was adhering to neutral principles, even as it distinguished
Buckley.305
One other possible argument against the Roberts Courts ad-
herence to neutral principles is that its campaign jurisprudence
actually reflects an interest in aiding particular groups such as
corporations or the wealthy. For instance, it has been suggested
more generally that the Roberts Court favors businesses, and a
recent study showed that it decided cases for the business litigants
more than had previous courts.306 But this evidence is not necessar-
ily a riposte to the operation of neutral principles. Neutral princi-
ples do not suggest that one side or the other should win more or
less often, but rather that the Court should follow the principles of
previous law. Thus, for instance, if the better argument under legal
doctrine is that corporations have full First Amendment rights, it is
not a violation of neutral principles for business interests to
continually beat back the claim that they do not. And, in fact, the
study of the Roberts Court has been criticized on the ground that it
fails to consider the shape of preexisting law.307
To be sure, adherence to neutral principles as a jurisprudential
touchstone has itself been subject to criticism. For instance, in
perhaps the most widely cited critique of this issue, Mark Tushnet
argues that a judge can always retrospectively reinterpret precedent
to generate a wide variety of principles.308 And certainly Tushnet is
302. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1975).
303. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446-47.
304. See id. at 1441, 1445.
305. See id. at 1445-46.
306. See Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1431, 1431, 1472 (2013).
307. See Jonathan H. Adler, Business and the Roberts Court Revisited (Again), VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (May 6, 2013, 11:20 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/05/06/business-and-the-roberts-
court-revisited-again/ [https://perma.cc/WNS8-9FUL].
308. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
900 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:841
right that precedents can be reinterpreted to yield different prin-
ciples. But that does not mean that one interpretation is not more
plausible than another. Consider this analogy: Given any sequence
of numbers, we can frame a rule to obtain whatever number we
want in the sequence. But for many sequences, particularly one with
a substantial sequence of numbers (say, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, or 1, 2, 3, 5, 8,
13), we would consider that one rule has more intuitive plausibility
than any other. So it is with the law: some principles that explain
previous precedent are more plausible than others.
Moreover, it is important to note that the dissenting Justices on
the Court do not generally frame their critique by arguing for the
impossibility of principle. Rather, they most often argue that their
decisions are better rooted in neutral principles than those of the
majority or plurality.309 In Davis, Justice Stevens argued that
permitting others to raise more money did not burden speech rights
of the millionaire.310 Most notably, Justice Kagan tried to argue
that Arizonas scheme comported with the governments right to
subsidize speech.311 These are attempts at justification by neutral
principles.312 The difficulty is that they are not as principled as the
majoritys elaboration. Indeed, in all but Justice Kagans dissent, as
previously discussed, it is quite obvious that the principles invoked
diverge from principles decisive in other free speech cases. Thus, the
kind of critique of neutral principles developed by Tushnet is largely
external to the debate on campaign finance regulation on the Court.
Another complaint may be that neutral principles are not neutral
in that judges can choose them with recognition of their consequen-
ces. But insofar as the principles cover a variety of current and
future disputes, it is much harder to predict the consequences that
will come by following them. Judges are thus under a thicker veil of
ignorance when using neutral principles.313 The First Amendment
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 814-15 (1983).
309. Occasionally, the dissenting Justices argue that principles should be revised for origin-
alist reasons. See infra note 320 and accompanying text. These are also principled arguments.
However, in this case they are unavailing because they are mistaken. See infra Part III.A.
310. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 753 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
311. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 223-25.
313. See Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1,
48 (2011).
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is a case in point. The determination that corporations had speech
rights was made in a wide variety of circumstances, not just in cam-
paign finance regulation. Of course, once the neutral principles are
in place, one can calculate the consequences of following them in a
particular case. But it is precisely to avoid such political and, in
campaign finance regulation cases, potentially partisan calculations
that neutral principles have a special attraction.
Professor Cass Sunstein provides a critique of neutral principles
more particularly focused on campaign legislation, namely that neu-
tral principles presuppose a prepolitical distribution of property.314
Thus, for Sunstein, Buckley and all campaign finance regulation
cases share a faulty premise that the government is a guarantor of
unrestricted speech markets,  because those markets depend on
distributions subject to regulation by the government.315 This
particular attack on the use of neutral principles in campaign
finance regulation is incompatible with both the foundations of our
Constitution and popular consensus. First, such a conception is
contrary to the understanding of the Framers of the Constitution as
well as the structure of the Constitution.316 The Constitution presup-
poses that some rights were prepolitical in the sense of being prior
to government, and that the distribution created by the exercise of
rights could be changed only by means of the structure they put in
place, including the First Amendment.317 Second, Sunsteins view
was not only rejected at the time of the Framing, but it is also wide-
ly rejected today. If people understood the distribution of resources
that support speech as subject to regulation by government, there
would not have been the outcry at the governments first oral
argument in Citizens United about banning the corporate release of
books about candidates318a distribution of information that
depends on a preexisting distribution of resources. Once it is
recognized that there are speech rights presumptively beyond
political regulation, the question of their protection must be decided
314. See Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to
Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8, 10-11 (1992).
315. Id. at 10-11.
316. See John O. McGinnis, The Partial Republican, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1751, 1760-62
(1994) (book review) (showing that the Constitution contemplates rights that are prepolitical
in the sense that political is meant to protect their exercise rather than reorder them).
317. Id.
318. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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by neutral principles that do not distinguish between sectors of soci-
ety like the media and nonmedia entities.319
III. OBJECTIONS TO APPLYING NEUTRAL FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES
There are three possible ways to attack the use of long-standing
First Amendment doctrine to settle campaign finance regulation.
The first is to argue that the original meaning of the Constitution
supports campaign finance regulation and thus justifies dispensing
with intervening precedent. The second is to contend that precedent
about elections other than overlapping free speech precedent should
control the outcome of campaign finance regulation. The third is to
introduce some new principle from political theory that is powerful
enough to reorganize the doctrine and permit campaign finance
regulation to survive.
All of these efforts have a common objective: reordering the rela-
tion between democracy and free speech previously established by
First Amendment doctrine, so that collectively enacted legislation
can dominate the civic order generated by individual rights. But all
suffer from common problems as well. The first difficulty is legiti-
macywhat makes it legitimate to use a particular methodology to
trump established First Amendment doctrine? The second problem
is the persuasiveness on the merits: few of the theories add some
convincing argument to those that the Court has already rejected.
The third issue is the impossibility of containing these arguments
so that they protect only campaign finance regulation that has
passed and do not destabilize the rest of free speech law.
A. Originalist Claims
It is not surprising that Justice Stevens in Citizens United and
Justice Breyer in McCutcheon tried to offer originalist reasons to
alter First Amendment principles. Originalism provides the most
powerful way to solve the problems of legitimacy in changing doc-
319. It is true that Citizens United itself created an outcry in some quarters. But that just
shows why the Court, being relatively insulated from the public, has the comparative
advantage in making principled decisions that are necessary to constitutional maintenance,
rather than following the unprincipled passions unleashed in the political process.
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trine.320 Indeed, Justices Scalia and Thomas, who were part of the
consistent campaign finance regulation majority, believe originalism
is the only legitimating theory of constitutional interpretation.321 All
the other Justices in the majority and almost everyone else on the
Court believe that originalism is at least a respectable modality of
constitutional interpretation,322 one that may be capable of altering
settled doctrine in some circumstances.323
But as we have also seen in considering the defects of Justice
Stevenss and Justice Breyers arguments, gesturing to originalism
is not enough to provide legitimacy. The academic efforts to support
campaign finance regulation through historical analysis may be
more sophisticated than those of the Justices, but they also have
methodological and substantive problems that prevent them from
succeeding.
Professor Lawrence Lessig, perhaps the most famous academic
opponent of the Courts campaign finance regulation jurisprudence,
suggests that the Framers believed that elections should make the
government dependent upon the people alone.324 That dependence,
according to Lessig, was the basic principle of republican govern-
ment at the time.325 As a result, Congress can legitimately regulate
campaign expenditures to prevent the distortion that would occur
from permitting legislators to become dependent on those who make
campaign contributions or expend large sums of money on elections,
rather than on the people themselves.326
320. Indeed, Robert Bork famously believed that neutral principles had to be derived only
from the original understanding of the Constitution rather than from case law. See Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1971). For
criticism of his claim that, so analyzed, the First Amendment protects only political speech,
see John O. McGinnis, Public Choice Originalism: Bork, Buchanan, and the Escape from the
Progressive Paradigm, 10 J.L. ECON. & POLY 669, 675-76 (2014).
321. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
37-47 (1997); Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1996).
322. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1982)
(describing and defending originalism as one modality of constitutional law).
323. Even nonoriginalists concede this point. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism
as a Political Practice: The Rights Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 554 (2006).
324. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESSAND A
PLAN TO STOP IT 130-31, 157-58 (2011).
325. Id. at 127-28.
326. Id. at 151. Lessig worries about two kinds of distortiondistortion of the issues that
get on the agenda and distortion of the substantive results of issues on the agenda. See id. at
151-52.
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Lessigs argument resembles the equality argument: permitting
campaign expenditures distorts the political process by giving the
opinions of some citizens greater salience than those of others. But
his focus on dependence actually undermines the claim that any
type of equality argument can be rooted in the original Constitution.
Although Lessig can adduce general statements from the period of
the Framing about the republican idea that legislators should be
dependent on the people,327 the difficulty is that he does not show
that the Framers thought that dependence should be policed by
regulating expression.
In fact, the Constitution does not provide any measure to deter-
mine how this opinion becomes distorted by the differential
exercise of rights under the First Amendment. The constitutional
dependence of representatives does not come from their being in
sync with the opinions of their constituents on any set of issues, but
from their desire to get the most votes in periodic elections.328 It is
striking that the Constitution does not include any mechanism of di-
rect democracy for determining issues in order to provide a baseline
for following public opinion. Indeed, the Framers rejected the idea
that representatives should be required to follow the instructions of
their constituents.329 Elected representatives were thus empowered
to prefer the opinions of a few over those of many, even if those few
had more money or more social influence.
The recognition that public opinion is made through expression
and has no fixed measure is also not novel; the idea goes back to the
early Republic. In their opposition to the Sedition Act of 1798, which
penalized criticism of government officials, the Democratic Republi-
cans recognized that public opinion was made by the unpredictable
collision of different ideas, rather than a static phenomenon that
327. See id. at 128 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison)).
328. Nonoriginalist theories that seek to restrict expression to improve the alignment of
the preferences of a representative with his or her constituents have similar problems in
locating a constitutional metric for measuring misalignment and providing a baseline for
regulating speech rights. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 283, 338-40 (2014). Moreover, unlike arguments that are rooted in origin-
alism, Stephanopouloss arguments also suffer from legitimacy problems because a new
political theory of how the polity should work cannot justify overturning campaign finance
regulation decisions rooted in years of precedent and the text and structure of the First
Amendment. See infra notes 371-83 and accompanying text.
329. Justice Breyer himself made this clear through the materials he quoted. See supra
notes 201-13 and accompanying text.
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law could protect from change between elections. As the historian
Gordon Wood writes, they believed that public opinion was the
combined product of multitudes of minds thinking and reflecting
independently, communicating their ideas in different ways, causing
opinions to collide and blend with one another, to refine and correct
each other, leading toward the ultimate triumph of Truth. 330
Professor Zephyr Teachout has pressed more textually based
arguments to show that the Framers were so obsessed with corrup-
tion that Congress should be allowed to define corruption broadly
enough to sustain significant campaign finance restrictions.331 The
clauses with the greatest nexus to corruption on which she relies are
the Emoluments Clause,332 the Incompatibility Clause,333 and the
Ineligibility Clause.334 According to Teachout, taken together these
clauses show that [t]he Framers were obsessed with corruption.335
But her arguments, if anything, support the Roberts Courts strin-
gent review of campaign finance regulation.
Even if one concluded that the provisions demonstrated an ob-
session with corruption,336 all of these clauses focus on the personal
330. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY:A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815,
at 311 (2009) (quoting TUNIS WORTMAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY, AND
THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS 123 (1800)).
331. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 348 (2009).
332. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ([N]o person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under
them, shall ... accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title of any kind whatever, from
any King, Prince, or foreign State.); see Teachout, supra note 331, at 359.
333. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ([N]o Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.); see Teachout, supra
note 331, at 359.
334. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased
during such time.); see Teachout, supra note 331, at 359.
335. Teachout, supra note 331, at 348.
336. These clauses, however, do not substantively imply a general concern with govern-
ment corruption because there are a lot of gaps in their coverage. As Seth Tillman has argued
at length, the Emoluments Clause does not cover members of Congress, and perhaps not even
the President and Vice President. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope
of Professor Teachouts Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 399, 406-08 (2012). In
fact, there is widespread agreement that the Emoluments Clause applies to Executive Branch
and Judicial Branch officers within the scope of the Appointments Clause (or Inferior Office
Appointments Clause, or Recess Appointments Clause). Id. at 407 n.27. But it is less clear
what other (nonelected) positions, if any, this clause may also apply to. Similarly, the
Incompatibility Clause does not try to prevent dependence of members of Congress on any
particular class of private citizens or on state officials, such as governors, who control
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corruption of government officials by other government officials,
either domestic or foreign. The Emoluments Clause prevents foreign
officials from bribing U.S. officials with gifts.337 The Incompatibility
Clause prevents the Executive from buying off members of Congress
by giving them additional offices within the Executive Branch.338
The Ineligibility Clause prevents Congress and the Executive from
entering into a conspiracy to buy off members of Congress by raising
the salary of a sinecure to which congressional members can be
appointed upon leaving Congress.339 The common theme here is that
officials are not to be trusted because they engage in self-dealing
and favor swapping with other officials. This understanding
underscores the agency costs of government: the difficulty the
principalsthe peopleface in controlling their government agents,
particularly when the government agents conspire among them-
selves.340
But as we have seen, one of the leading concerns about campaign
finance legislation is that it represents a conspiracy by government
officials to increase agency costs by entrenching incumbents against
challengers, thereby allowing them to continue to enjoy the per-
quisites of office.341 If we were looking at these clauses with a high
appointments to lucrative office. Instead, the clause seeks to ensure only a limited
congressional independence primarily by precluding members from simultaneously serving
in offices subject to the Presidents (or his appointees) appointment power. Cf. id. at 417-18.
The Ineligibility Clause tries to prevent self-interest from distorting congressional judgment,
but only by preventing Congress and the Executive from creating higher pay for offices that
members of Congress will later fill, presumably in return for services rendered, including
voting correctly on other legislation. See id. at 420-21. It does not even violate the
Ineligibility Clause to appoint members of Congress to lucrative offices for which pay is not
increased! Given their limited coverage and many loopholes, from the perspective of
preventing corruption, it is difficult to make the case that these clauses point to an obsession
with corruption rather than to a solution to a specific set of problems.
337. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 ([N]o person holding any Office of Profit or Trust
under them, shall ... accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever,
from any King, Prince, or foreign State.) (emphasis added).
338. See id. § 6, cl. 2 ([N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a
Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.).
339. See id. (No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall
have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time.).
340. See Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583,
1590-91 (2010) (seeing the main purpose of many constitutional provisions as reducing agency
costs).
341. See supra notes 167-73 and accompanying text.
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level of generality, their structural message is one of distrust of
representatives, which should encourage the application of the
strictest scrutiny of campaign legislation with the kind of doctrines
that the Roberts Court has employed to test their bona fides.342
To support her position, Teachout also adduces some very general
clauses of the Constitution, mostly checks and balances such as the
veto power and bicameralism.343 These clauses have many broader
purposes than preventing corruption, like requiring a consensus for
federal legislation344 and protecting federalism by making it difficult
for the federal government to displace state legislation.345 Their
multiplicity of purpose makes it difficult to mold them into struc-
tural swords aimed at corruption in particular. And here, too, a
more obvious message of forcing ambition ... to counteract ambi-
tion346 is to be distrustful of politicians ambitions for office and
entrenched power. The distrust of the separation of powers natu-
rally leads to a more stringent standard of judicial review for the
legislative impositions on the liberties of citizens.
B. Contrary Precedents
A second argument for displacing neutral free speech principles
is that the Court should look to other precedents about constitu-
tional provisions relevant to elections because expression seeking to
influence a campaign is an aspect of the electoral process.347 The
argument comes in two varieties. One is that the Court should defer
342. To be clear, this interpretation is not likely a good enough originalist argument to
change a long history of precedent to the contrary, but Teachouts argument more plausibly
reinforces the Roberts Courts decision to apply stringent scrutiny to the public interest claims
made for campaign finance legislation.
343. See Teachout, supra note 331, at 365-70.
344. See Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State
Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1130 (2006)
(arguing that bicameralism and the presidential veto require substantial national consensus
to pass federal legislation); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules
as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 365, 394 (1999) (same).
345. See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1456 (2001).
346. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
347. See Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1218
(1999) (looking at campaign finance regulation through the prism of the structure of elections
rather than rights-based law).
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to legislative decisions as it does in some important election law
cases. To run an election, the legislature determines the districts,
makes rules about which candidates have access to the ballot, and
chooses the manner of voting. Here, the argument runs, the legis-
lature often receives substantial deference from the Court. Thus, it
should receive similar deference in campaign finance regulation.
The other argument is that some precedent concerning elec-
tionslike the one-person, one-vote doctrinemandates, or at least
justifies, campaign finance regulation.
Before considering the details of these separate contentions, it is
important to note that these arguments try to recapitulate in the
form of precedent two elements that First Amendment jurispru-
dence has long rejected. First, the analogy to elections elides the
distinction between actions of individuals and actions of the
government. Electoral mechanisms by their nature require govern-
ment action: they are a creature of the state. Election precedents
thus focus on the fairness of the electoral mechanism, which the
government itself establishes.348 In contrast, expressive activity
requires no government regulation outside the general rules of prop-
erty, tort, and contract. First Amendment precedent is expressly
designed to protect the civic order created by these rights from
suppression and manipulation. In short, election precedents address
an activity suffused by government, whereas First Amendment
precedents address an activity to be presumptively walled off from
government.
Second, the analogy to elections wrongly suggests that expression
at election time can be segregated from the political debate that is
ever-billowing in a democracy. To be sure, elections happen at dis-
crete times with particular mechanisms. But the back and forth of
political and social debate, in contrast, is not an aspect of govern-
ment mechanisms for elections, but part of an ever-flowing stream
of the public discourse.
For those who believe the Court should defer to campaign regula-
tion, the most important recent case is Vieth v. Jubelirer, in which
the Court deferred to the legislatures choices in drawing electoral
348. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05, 110-11 (2000) (concluding that the Florida
recount resulted in vote dilution); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (establishing
one-person, one-vote). For discussion of more such cases, see infra note 351.
2016] CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROBLEMS 909
districts.349 There, a plurality of the Court held that the constitu-
tionality of partisan gerrymandering was nonjusticiable because
there were no judicially administrable rules to police the practice.350
The arguments for deference in Vieth cut against deference in
campaign finance regulation. Deference in Vieth prevented the
Court from exercising discretion without judicially administrable
rules, but making distinctions about which expressions are election
relatedand thus subject to regulationand which expressions are
not so relatedand thus protectedwould require the Court to
exercise discretion without judicially administrable rules. Neutral
principles that protect expressive activity at all times and apply to
all sectors of society are much easier to administer. Moreover, as
noted above, electoral precedent is about the governance of electoral
mechanisms that the government establishes and whose details the
Court cannot easily supervise. The pervasive government setting
necessitates a modicum of deference.351 But speech does not owe its
349. See 41 U.S. 267, 305-06 (2004); see also Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and
Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1406-08 (2013) (noting the potential
relevance of Vieth to campaign finance regulation).
350. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305-06 (plurality opinion). In his decisive concurrence, Justice
Kennedy did not go quite so far as the plurality in foreclosing judicial review of
gerrymandering, but he agreed that judicial restraint was required until a clear principle for
regulating gerrymandering was identified. See id. at 306, 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
351. Ballot access cases are another kind of electoral mechanism case in which the Court
gives a measure of deference to the government. See Dmitri Evseev, A Second Look at Third
Parties: Correcting the Supreme Courts Understanding of Elections, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1277,
1319 (2005). In ballot cases, a party or individual complains of obstruction in getting his name
on the ballot. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 727-28 (1974). But these cases are also
inapposite for similar functional and doctrinal reasons as those that undermine the relevance
of the gerrymandering cases. It is true that in ballot access cases there is at least a First
Amendment claim. See Evseev, supra, at 1278-79. However, the claim is not one of free speech
but rather of free association. More fundamentally, the ballot, like the electoral district, is a
creation of the government, not of the citizens. As the Supreme Court has noted, as a prac-
tical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.
Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 (rejecting certain restrictions on ballot access for independent candi-
dates). The need for the government to fashion access rules is a reason for discretion.
Cases that focus on the voting rights of citizens are similar to candidate ballot access cases.
Again, a theme is that states enjoy some discretion because they must make choices about the
electoral process. As an example, consider Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), probably
the most cited voting rights case. There, the Court declined to disturb Hawaiis refusal to
permit write-in ballots in either its primary or general elections. See Takushi, 504 U.S. at 441-
42. The Court held that any incidental effect on voting or First Amendment rights of assoc-
iation was outweighed by the states interest in structuring an electoral mechanism to
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existence to government, and the Court need not defer to the
government for the speech to flourish.
The paradigmatic case for arguing that election law precedent
justifies regulation is Reynolds v. Sims, requiring one-person, one-
vote.352 The argument runs that unequal speech around election
time leads to unequal influence, making the votes of citizens
effectively unequal.353 As a matter of doctrine, this claim is a
stretch. The problem in Reynolds was that the state made affirma-
tive decisions in creating legislative districts of widely varying size
so as to make the weight of actual votes unequal.354 Expression at
any time, including elections, is not the responsibility of the
government. Nor does the differential exercise of First Amendment
rights prevent the government from establishing voting districts
and other procedures that ensure that everyones vote is counted
with equal weight.
Most recently, advocates for campaign finance regulation have
claimed support in a case that did indeed reject a free speech
claim.355 In Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, the Court
refused to accept the First Amendment argument of a Nevada leg-
islator who complained that the legislature would not let him vote
or speak on an issue in which he had a financial interest because
state law prohibited such self-interested participation.356 In an
opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court said that the representative had
no right to vote on the issue, and thus no right to speak, because the
winnow out candidates in an orderly manner that focused attention on the most contested
races, which were likely to be those with candidates on the ballot rather than write-in
candidates. Id. at 438-39 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 735). The state must make decisions
about how to structure its electoral process and gets deference because its interest is
substantial. Individuals are at liberty to advocate for the election of anyone they want, but
counting votes will be determined by reasonable electoral rules.
352. See 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964).
353. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1,
32 (2012) (stating that one-person, one-vote cases show that [g]overnment has an interest in
equalizing ... influence in elections (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 350
(2010))); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and Practical
Superiority of Democratically Financed Elections, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1160, 1161, 1164 (1994)
(arguing that equal protection analysis of Reynolds v. Sims rather than free speech doctrine
should govern treatment of campaign finance regulation).
354. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 540-41.
355. See Hellman, supra note 349, at 1390, 1398.
356. See 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2346-47 (2011).
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right to speak in a legislature is dependent on the right to vote.357 If
nonvoters had the right to speak, the legislature would become a
town meeting, not a deliberative body.358
While this case is a precedent on free speech, it supports rather
than undermines the Roberts Courts application of free speech
principles in campaign finance regulation cases. The Courts opinion
relied on the long tradition of disqualifying legislators with financial
interestsone that dates back to Thomas Jeffersons rules when he
was President of the Senatesuggesting it showed that such re-
strictions could not be considered to interfere with the concept of
freedom of speech.359 There is no analogous tradition going back to
the Founding Era of restrictions similar to those campaign finance
regulations invalidated by the Court.
Even more fundamentally, the case underscores the distinction
between regulating the actions of government officials alone and the
actions of citizens. Justice Scalia observed that the legislators vote
was not personal to him but to the people, and thus was not protec-
ted by the First Amendment.360 Carrigans overall message reminds
us that the regulation of government officials is fundamentally dif-
ferent from the regulation of private citizens. Precedent for the
former is not precedent for the latter.
C. Constitutional and Political Theory
Perhaps the most cited argument as a matter of constitutional
theory is what has been called electoral exceptionalism.361
Electoral exceptionalism is the view that the First Amendment
simply should not apply in the same way to speech at election time
as it does to other speech.362 Instead of applying principles estab-
lished elsewhere in First Amendment law, one should create special
First Amendment law for elections. In a sense, it is the opposite
357. See id. at 2347.
358. See id.
359. See id. at 2348-49.
360. See id. at 2350.
361. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1805 (1999).
362. Id. at 1805-06.
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theory of the Roberts Courts view of the relation between electoral
speech and the First Amendment.
First, according to electoral exceptionalism, elections should be
constitutionally understood as (relatively) bounded domains of
communicative activity.363 Second, within that domain, the Court
should not be bound by principles of individual rights that cut
across speech domains, because that conception is itself wrong-
headed.364 According to the originators of this idea, rights are less
protections for intrinsic interests of individuals than linguistic tools
the law invokes in the pragmatic task of bringing certain issues
before the courts for judicial resolution.365 These resolutions should
focus on the common good.366
The first premise is false as a factual matter. There is no prin-
cipled boundary between electoral speech and political speech more
generally. Democracy is an ever-bubbling cauldron of political ideas
and endorsements during, between, and after elections. It is com-
monplace to say that the next election season begins the day after
counting the votes of the last election has ended. In particular, the
media helps set the agenda long before a campaign begins. Even
this agenda is shaped by academics and social theorists long before
the campaign. Moreover, creating this artificial boundary has a
clear partisan valence because Republicans are far less well
represented among the academics and media who shape our politics
between cycles.367
The second premise is wrong as a matter of law. The claim that
rights are linguistic tools that give power to judges to make
pragmatic decisions about issues flies in the face not only of the ob-
vious structure and history of the First Amendment as a right, but
of the nature of judicial review itself. The First Amendment was
called a right by its author, James Madison, and was analogized to
other individual rights.368 It has been treated throughout its history
as a right of the individual rather than a tool by which judges can
make decisions about the common good. And if one is not concerned
363. Id. at 1805.
364. See id. at 1818-19.
365. Id. at 1814.
366. Id.
367. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
368. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
2016] CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROBLEMS 913
with the original meaning of the Amendment, the contemporary
consensus about its nature is the same: any nominee who argued
that the First Amendment (and other rights in the Bill of Rights)
was a linguistic tool and not a right would not be confirmed as a
judge.
The view that judicial review is about putting issues before the
Court for pragmatic resolution has nothing in common with the
defense of judicial review that the Framers gave. Justices were to be
entrusted with this awesome duty because they were bound by
strict rules and precedents,369 not because they could be trusted
to make good pragmatic judgments. And whatever normative at-
traction the latter view could conceivably have in areas other than
the First Amendment, it is particularly troublesome there. Judges
are actors appointed by politicians and have clear partisan affilia-
tions. Their decisions about who can speak at what time in cam-
paigns have clear political consequences. In this area, above all, we
would want them to be bound by strict rules and precedents.370
The final way to trump First Amendment doctrine is to appeal to
a political principle that justifies reordering the doctrine. The most
interesting political theory case for reconfiguration of First Amend-
ment doctrine in the campaign finance regulation area is that of
Professor Deborah Hellman.371 She argues that the idea of corrup-
tion in an institution is dependent on the nature of the institution,
and thus the notion of corruption in a democracy is parasitic to our
understanding of the nature of democracy.372 For instance, if one
believes that having unequal influence is incompatible with the leg-
islators democratic duty to weigh everyones interest equally,
unequal influence is a form of corruption.373 From this insight, she
argues that the Court should defer to the legislatures view of
democracy, both because the legislature itself has the primary re-
sponsibility of defining the role of a legislator in a democracy, and
because the Court has no manageable standards to define that
role.374
369. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
370. See id.
371. See Hellman, supra note 349, at 1394-95.
372. See id.
373. See id. at 1399-400.
374. See id. at 1385, 1412.
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Hellman gets to the nub of the issue in campaign finance regu-
lation.375 Democracy can indeed be defined in various ways that will
give greater or less space to speech rights. This fundamental tension
is not surprising. Many modern democratic states are to some de-
gree also liberal states in that they define some set of rights that
majorities cannot modify. But the contours of these rights and their
relation to democracy differ depending on the constitutional set-
tlement of the particular polityespecially in the capacity of free
speechand create a more or less freewheeling political debate at
election time.
In France, for instance, the relationship between free speech and
democracy is wholly different from that relationship in the United
States. There, the legislature carves out a space in which elections
are protected from spontaneous civic ordering. Candidates have re-
stricted advertising, and even their posters are regulated for size.376
The media must give equal time to all candidates, including the no-
hopers like monarchists and Trotskyites, with the unhappy result
that serious candidates get less coverage than they otherwise
375. Professor Robert Posts proffer of a political theory to reorder the campaign finance
regulation cases is less successful on its own terms. He argues that concerns for electoral
integrity justify campaign finance regulation. See POST, supra note 213, at 61-62 (arguing
that electoral integrity requires representatives to be responsive to the people). But his is
not an originalist argumentPost is a critic of originalismand thus does not gain legitimacy
from that quarter. He calls First Amendment doctrine clumsy, id. at 4, but it is unclear, to
say the least, why his views should take priority over years of precedent decided by different
Justices in widely different free speech contexts. And his notion of electoral integrity does not
contribute anything particularly new to the debate. There are three important electoral
aspects that the Court has considered as justifications for campaign finance regulation:
corruption, distortion or undue influence, and inequality. In Posts sense, all are species of
electoral integrity in that they can prevent legislators from being responsive to the people.
Electoral integrity is a term that is more opaque than those three concepts, but that is an
unfortunate characteristic of a legal term, as opaqueness can mask political decision making,
particularly in this area in which political temptations are so great. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan,
Citizens Deflected: Electoral Integrity and Political Reform, in CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 141, 150 (2014) (worrying that Posts electoral
integrity concept could be used to uphold voter ID laws). And like other academic proposals
for a new campaign finance regulation framework, Post has no principled way to prevent elec-
toral integrity from justifying regulation of the press, because a powerful press can make
politicians responsive to it rather than to the people. See infra notes 380-83 and accompanying
text.
376. See Bruce Crumley, Frances Stringent Election Laws: Lessons for the Americas Free-
for-All Campaigns, TIME (Apr. 20, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/04/20/frances-stringent-
election-laws-lessons-for-the-americas-free-for-all-campaigns/ [https://perma.cc/8CXW-6HFV].
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would.377 This process does represent a vision of democracyone in
which election discourse with unequal influence would be corrupt-
ing, and which is strictly limited in the interests of equality and
order and in which there is top-down ordering for civic discourse
around election time. It is a very different, more insular regime from
the one in the United States, for instance, making it very difficult
for outsiders like Ross Perot to substantially contest an election and
put a new issue, like the deficit, front and center in politics.378 If we
deferred to the legislatures conception of a possible ideal of the re-
lation between democracy and speech rights, this electoral regime
should be upheld here.
Yet it would not be legally sound under the Constitution of the
United States for the Court to defer to a legislative decision that
would create this kind of relation between democracy and free
speech. Part I has already shown that this kind of deference over-
turns a host of core free speech principles and would not comport
with the Framers notion of free speech as rights that individuals ex-
ercise either alone or in organizations to create a civic order free
from government control. Given its premises, Hellmans conceptual
analysis is much more analytically tidy and accurate than those of
scholars who attempt originalist, or simply precedential, arguments
on behalf of campaign finance regulation.379 But because her argu-
ments are not rooted in either originalism or free speech doctrine,
and given the background of precedent, tradition, and text with
which they conflict, their premises lack force as legal arguments.
Finally, a sweeping political theory argument like Hellmans
proves too much because it would justify regulation of the press on
the grounds that the media has too much influence on elections.380
377. See Scott Sayare, As Candidates Speak in France, the Meter is Running, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/08/world/europe/as-french-candidates-speak-
the-meter-is-running.html [https://perma.cc/RR3S-ACSP].
378. See Elhauge, supra note 173, at 156.
379. Hellman does make some arguments from precedent; the major ones have been
addressed previously. See supra notes 371-74 and accompanying text.
380. Lessigs dependence argument, see supra notes 324-27 and accompanying text, and
Teachouts corruption argument, see supra notes 331-46 and accompanying text, suffer from
a similar problem of boundlessness that encroaches on the core of First Amendment doctrine.
The media can have substantial influence on elected officials. If one wants to permit legisla-
tures to make sure that a politician is not dependent on anything or anyone but the people,
one could regulate the media as much as independent expenditures, because the media influ-
ence may make politicians dependent on the media.
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Any reordering that has this result is a principle that neither com-
ports with past precedent nor with current intuitions.381 Lest one
think that regulation of the media on the basis of concern about
inequality is speculative, there is substantial evidence showing that
the media can wield large amounts of influenceamounts that
dwarf those of other corporations. For instance, the New York Times
endorsement is all-important in local elections in New York City
and State.382 And all over the country, politicians act as if media en-
dorsements matter, spending many hours with editorial boards.
Campaign restrictions on the use of other money in politics would
magnify this influence, permitting those in this sector to wield even
more influence than other citizens. Britain, for instance, has severe
regulations on how much citizens can spend and contribute, and
both the Labor and Conservative Parties spend a lot of time and
effort cozying up to press barons as a result.383 If equality concerns
shape our view of what constitutes corruption, a legislature would
be justified in adopting a view of democracy that would begin by
regulating our media aristocracy.
CONCLUSION
Of all the provisions of the Constitution, the First Amendment
has given rise to the most majestic edifice of doctrine. In hundreds
of cases from disparate walks of lifecommerce, art, and poli-
ticsthe Court has teased out the logic of the Amendments
underlying plan: protect a civic discourse created by individual
choice, unfettered by government control except in the most compel-
ling of circumstances. Over time the case law has also elucidated the
weight of an interest that qualifies as compelling, as well as the
burdens the government must shoulder in making its proof.
381. Current intuitions are reflected in the reaction to the answer to the government at the
first Citizens United oral argument. See supra notes 135, 318 and accompanying text.
382. See David Freedlander, The Editorial Plea: How the New York Times Decides Who
Wins and Loses Local Elections, OBSERVER (May 2, 2012, 6:03 AM), http://observer.com/2012/
05/the-editorial-plea-how-the-new-york-times-decides-who-wins-and-loses-local-elections/
[https://perma.cc/V33K-PWPY].
383. See Jacob Rowbottom, How Campaign Finance Laws Made the British Press So
Powerful, NEW REPUBLIC (July 25, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/world/92507/campaign-
finance-united-kingdom-news-corporation [https://perma.cc/7JBB-CUAP].
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As there is an inner logic of free speech doctrine that reflects the
First Amendments plan, there is always an inner temptation to
distort its application. In the regulation of political campaigns, that
temptation is at its greatest. The Justices owe their high position to
choices of partisan politicspolitics that will be shaped directly by
their decisions in this area. The temptation is all the more powerful,
because by controlling the expression of ordinary citizens, campaign
finance regulation aggrandizes the influence of members of the
press and academics, the citizens most responsible for determining
the Justices reputation.
The Roberts Court majority has escaped this temptation by
recurring to the First Amendment principles in contexts other than
political campaigns. The principles forged over decades by Justices
of many different political parties provide assurance that the
Justices themselves are not acting to favor one party or ideology
over another.
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